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Difficulty of Care: Aligning Tax and Health Care
Policy for Family Caregiving
Christine S. Speidel*
In the United States millions of people live with disabilities, many of whom
require assistance with activities of daily life to remain in their homes and
communities. However, financial support for this assistance is limited. Many
caregivers forgo working outside the home in order to provide care to a
family member. And while state and federal programs provide some
compensation for caregiving, caregivers frequently face problems including
poverty, lack of health insurance, lack of Social Security and Medicare
credits, and lack of retirement savings. Our nation’s paltry support for
caregiving threatens the practical ability of people with disabilities to
choose community integration over institutional living.
This Essay examines the little-known and little-used “difficulty of care”
gross income exclusion under I.R.C. § 131 as a possible vehicle to improve
this picture. While § 131 originated as an exclusion for foster payments, it
was reinterpreted in IRS Notice 2014-7 to apply to contemporary programs
for in-home services and supports. Unfortunately, the impact of this
reinterpretation was complicated and hotly contested. This Essay juxtaposes
the evolution of home and community-based health care services, the
Affordable Care Act, and the evolution of tax expenditures for low-income
taxpayers to explain how the tax and health care systems collided in the
aftermath of Notice 2014-7.
This Essay reveals tensions and contradictions between tax and health
care policy, informed by case examples and by ground-level considerations
of program administration. It suggests that a gross income exclusion is an
ineffective means to implement policy preferences and that policymakers
should undertake a broader examination of the interactions between health
* Assistant Professor and Director of the Federal Tax Clinic, Villanova University Charles
Widger School of Law. My sincere thanks to the participants of the 2019 Critical Tax Conference
at Pepperdine Caruso School of Law and to Stephanie Hoffer, Leslie Book, Wayne Turner, Kathryn
Sedo, and Francine Lipman for their insights and encouragement. I am grateful to the organizers of
the 2020 Loyola Chicago Tax Policy Symposium and to Becky Bavlsik. I benefited from discussing
“difficulty of care” issues with several of my fellow tax clinic directors including Caleb Smith,
Daniel Kempland, and Sarah Lora. I received research assistance from Anna Gooch, Katherine S.
Smith, Michael Cardone, Charles Butrico, Lisa Riley, William Cowen, and Alexandra Santulli.
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and tax provisions when considering financial supports for caregiving.
Finally, the Essay offers preliminary considerations for redesigning tax
supports for caregiving, both to better reflect the values of dignity and
autonomy that underlie home-based services, and to prevent unintended
harm to low-income families.
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INTRODUCTION
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed inequities and hardships faced
by disabled people and those who care for them.1 The inaugural Family
Caregiving Advisory Council is poised to deliver its first annual report to
Congress pursuant to the RAISE Family Caregivers Act of 2017.2 The
time is ripe for a reexamination of national disability and caregiving
policy, as disability activists recently celebrated the thirtieth anniversary
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 3 and the twentieth
anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal Olmstead decision.4
Nationwide over forty million people live with disabilities,5 with over
fourteen million reporting difficulty with independent living.6 In order to
live at home or in community settings, individuals with disabilities may
need help with activities of daily living—such as bathing, dressing,

1. See, e.g., COVID-19 Poses Unique Challenges for People with Disabilities, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIV.: HUB (Apr. 23, 2020), https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/04/23/how-covid-19-affects-people-withdisabilities/ [https://perma.cc/RHZ7-64ES]; Kristi L. Kirschner et al., The Invisible COVID Workforce: Direct Care Workers for Those with Disabilities, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 21, 2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2020/invisible-covid-workforce-direct-care-workersthose-disabilities [https://perma.cc/Z9MJ-2MKK]; Roni Caryn Rabin, Developmental Disabilities
Heighten Risk of Covid Death, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/health/covid-developmental-disabilities.html
[https://perma.cc/DMN2F26A]; see generally COVID-19 Outbreak and Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T
ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/covid-19.html
[https://perma.cc/5VYT-WF5G] (July 24, 2020) (collecting resources).
2. See Recognize, Assist, Include, Support, and Engage Family Caregivers Act of 2017, Pub. L.
No. 115-119, § 4(d), 132 Stat. 23, 26.
3. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(4), 104
Stat. 327, 329 (stating Congress’s purpose for the Act was, in part, “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”).
4. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999) (holding that unjustified isolation of persons with
disabilities is discrimination in violation of the ADA).
5. 2018 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-Year Estimates: Disability Characteristics, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=S1810&g=0100000US&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S1810
[https://perma.cc/5WBW-HDRW]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2021) [hereinafter 2018 ACS]. Individuals with disabilities are 12.6% of the
civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the United States. Id. Disability is not simple to define,
and figures vary some from study to study. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for
example, reports that 61 million adults in the United States live with a disability. Disability Impacts
All of Us, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/infographic-disability-impacts-all.html [https://perma.cc/QY8M-MP3Z] (last visited
Dec. 21, 2020).
6. 2018 ACS, supra note 5. See also American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community
Survey 2018 Subject Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 59–62, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/subject_definitions/2018_ACSSubjectDefinitions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PAQ-SJJM] (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
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moving around within the home, eating, and taking medications. 7 In
2013, the national Commission on Long-Term Care reported that over
twelve million people receive care at home to support their quality of life
and their independence.8
The National Academy for State Health Policy recently analyzed
hundreds of recommendations from over two dozen multi-stakeholder
reports relevant to family caregiving. 9 The resulting report distills
overlapping recommendations for improving our national caregiving
strategy. Among the top recommendations was strengthening financial
supports for caregiving.10 As policymakers consider expanding financial
supports for caregivers, this Essay offers a cautionary tale from the world
of tax.
We begin with a real-world example.11 Kerrie Reilly’s daughter, K.R.,
was born with a developmental disability. Although K.R. is an adult, she
requires constant supervision to live safely in her home. K.R. requires
care similar to that needed by a three-year-old, “that is, anticipating
everyday hazards and intervening to avert harm.”12 Ms. Reilly does not
7. Peter F. Edemekong et al., Activities of Daily Living, STATPEARLS,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470404/ [https://perma.cc/XU42-S6P4] (June 26,
2020). In the 2018 American Community Survey, nearly eight million people reported difficulty
with self-care activities. 2018 ACS, supra note 5. It is important to note that the nature and severity
of disabilities vary widely. The Census Bureau acknowledged the difficulty of measuring this
“complex concept,” noting that “disability is a dynamic concept that changes over time as one’s
health improves or declines, as technology advances, and as social structures adapt. As such, disability is a continuum in which the degree of difficulty may also increase or decrease.” American
Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey 2018 Subject Definitions, supra note 6, at
59–60. While this Essay focuses on individuals who require in-home care, many individuals with
disabilities do not require caregiving to live and work independently.
8. STAFF OF S. COMM’N ON LONG-TERM CARE, 113TH CONG., REP. TO THE CONGRESS 3 (Sept.
30, 2013) [hereinafter COMM’N ON LONG-TERM CARE, 2013 REPORT].
9. Wendy Fox-Grage, Inventory of Key Family Caregiver Recommendations, NAT’L ACAD. FOR
STATE HEALTH POL’Y 1 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nashp.org/inventory-of-key-family-caregiver-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/EM4R-8KAQ].
10. Similarly, the Family Caregiving Advisory Council has recognized the need to protect and
enhance financial security for caregivers and adopted a recommendation to “decrease the negative
financial impacts for family caregivers on both a short- and long-term basis.” Family Caregiving
Advisory Council: Final Recommendations, ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING 5 (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://acl.gov/sites/default/files/raise_sgrg/raise%20recommendations%20final%20web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FMK-KF89].
11. This example is taken from a recent California case, Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority, 472
P.3d 472 (Cal. 2020). Examples of families in similar circumstances may be found in other cases
including In re Hite, 557 B.R. 451 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2016) (examining a bankruptcy claim made
by a couple providing full-time care for their adult son who “is wheelchair-bound and has autism,
cerebral palsy and Lennox-Gastaut syndrome, a rare and debilitating form of epilepsy”) and Ray v.
United States, 993 F. Supp. 2d 760 (S.D. Ohio 2014), vacated, No. 2:12-cv-677, 2014 WL
12852321 (S. D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2014) (involving a tax refund claim by a mother who cared for her
adult son who “cannot walk, talk, or feed himself, is unable to provide for his needs and requires
round-the-clock care”).
12. See Reilly, 472 P.3d at 477.
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work outside the home because she cannot afford paid care for K.R.
Instead, Ms. Reilly is paid through a state and federally funded In-Home
Supportive Services (IHSS) program.13 Although K.R. requires twentyfour-hour supervision, her mother’s paid caregiving hours are statutorily
capped at 283 hours per month,14 making her income about $40,000 per
year.15
This Essay examines the supports available to the families like the
Reillys through the health and tax systems. Common problems identified
for family caregivers include poverty, lack of health insurance and access
to health care for themselves, lack of Social Security and Medicare
credits, and lack of retirement savings.16 For care recipients, challenges
often include lack of agency and choice in how to live their lives.17
Several articles have examined federal tax supports for caregiving.18
13. In the Reillys’ home state of California, IHSS is funded partly through a Medicaid waiver.
Id. at 485.
14. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, §§ 12303.4(b), 14132.952(g) (West 2020) (capping inhome caregiving hours and reimbursement rates).
15. The average hourly wage under IHSS in California for 2019 was about $12 per hour. See
County IHSS Wage Rates, CA.GOV, https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/ihss/county-ihss-wagerates [https://perma.cc/U54Q-2W6C] (last visited Nov. 16, 2019 via Wayback Machine) (estimating Ms. Reilly’s income at $12 × 283 × 12 = $40,752 ($12 per hour compensation multiplied by
the 283-day cap multiplied by a standard twelve-hour day)). The record does not disclose Ms.
Reilly’s actual income. See generally Reilly, 472 P.3d. 472.
16. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Family Caregiving and the Intergenerational Transmission of
Poverty, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 629, 630 (2018) [hereinafter Kaplan, Family Caregiving]; Economic Impact of Family Caregiving, in FAMILIES CARING FOR AN AGING AMERICA 127–28 (Richard Schulz & Jill Eden, eds., 2016) (“Researchers, advocates, and observers have raised concerns
that the demands of caregiving can negatively impact caregivers’ ability to stay in the workforce
and thus jeopardize their income, job security, personal retirement savings, eventual Social Security
and retirement benefits, career opportunities, and overall long-term financial well-being.”); CDC
Caregiver Brief, infra note 24, at 4, 7 (noting that 92.9% of caregivers aged forty-five years and
older have health insurance but only 79.3% of them reported having had a routine checkup in the
past year and 17.6% reported experiencing fourteen or more physically unhealthy days in the past
month).
17. See, e.g., Michael Ogg, Remaining at Home with Severe Disability, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 1046,
1049
(2019);
see
also
About
Olmstead,
ADA.GOV,
https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_about.htm [https://perma.cc/VSX8-HY5N] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2021) (documenting personal stories of a few of the thousands of beneficiaries of the
Olmstead decision and the subsequent Department of Justice actions).
18. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Federal Tax Policy and Family-Provided Care for Older
Adults, 25 VA. TAX REV. 509, 561–62 (2005) [hereinafter Kaplan, Federal Tax Policy] (advocating
for tax credits for family caregivers); Nancy E. Shurtz, Tax, Class, Women, and Elder Care, 43
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 223 passim (2019) (advocating changes to the tax system including a refundable credit for both care receiver and provider, among other changes, to protect marginalized groups
including women, the poor, and the elderly); Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging
World: Sharing Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
563, 585 (2002) (“The federal dependent care tax deduction, in place since 1976, allows individuals
to claim a deduction against federal income tax liabilities for caregiving-related expenses in excess

508

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

Scholars examining tax supports for family caregiving—including the
dependency exemption, tax-advantaged savings accounts, and the
medical expense deduction—have widely concluded that the tax code
provides very poor support for caregiving.19 This Essay does not dispute
this overall conclusion. Instead, it offers a close look at one largely
overlooked provision, the “difficulty of care” gross income exclusion
under Internal Revenue Code § 131, and posits that this benefit provides
a useful prism through which to examine the points of friction that have
emerged as health and disability law and federal income tax law and
administration have developed on separate trajectories over the last forty
years.
The difficulty of care exclusion is an income tax break for community
caregivers of disabled adults who are “placed” with a “foster care”
provider.20 It is a little-known and little-used provision, perhaps because
it is built on top of an exclusion for foster child payments, also found in
§ 131.21 Eligibility for the exclusion has also been unclear. Parental
caregivers’ attempts to access this benefit were unsuccessful for decades.
Then in 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reinterpreted § 131 in
a manner that attempted to recognize the realities of modern state
programs for community care of adults with disabilities, which often
support family caregiving under a beneficiary-directed model.
Unfortunately this reinterpretation came via subregulatory guidance
without the benefit of public comment or formal input from those best
positioned to inform the IRS about the full ramifications and complexities
of its interpretive shift. This well-motivated move by the IRS set off a
conflict between caregivers who benefited from the exclusion and
caregivers who were financially harmed by it due to Congress’s gradual
of 7.5% of their gross income.”); John Jankowski, Caregiver Credits in France, Germany, and
Sweden: Lessons for the United States, 71 SOC. SEC. BULL. 61 passim (2011) (examining the caregiver credit systems in European countries and considering their potential in the United States);
Alexandra M. Ferrara, Note, Incentivizing the Care of Adult Family Members Through a Two-Part
Tax Credit, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 819 passim (2019) (advocating for government subsidies for family
adult care).
19. See, e.g., Kaplan, Federal Tax Policy, supra note 18, at 560–61 (“[T]he tax code's existing
provisions for personal exemptions and medical expense deductions provide relief to only a limited
extent and under fairly uncertain conditions.”); Shurtz, supra note 18, at 264–83 (detailing “tax
system failures”); Ferrara, supra note 18, at 841 (“[T]he current federal tax code does not provide
a broadly accessible incentive that addresses the positive benefits created by family adult care or
the unique characteristics of the adult population, justifying the creation of a new tax incentive.”).
Cf. Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement (SECURE) Act of 2019, Pub. L.
No. 116-94, § 116(a)(1), 133 Stat. 3137, 3161 (defining “difficulty of care” payments to foster care
providers as “compensation” when considering 401(k) and IRA contribution requirements, allowing caregivers to contribute to a retirement account).
20. I.R.C. § 131(c).
21. This Essay does not address the exclusion for foster payments to caregivers of minor children under I.R.C. § 131(b).
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expansion of income-based refundable tax credits.
This Essay uses the difficulty of care exclusion to illuminate littleknown but consequential interactions, frictions, inconsistencies, and
uncertainties that adults with disabilities and their family caregivers face.
It offers preliminary suggestions for lawmakers to better align our federal
tax system to support family caregiving and community living for adults
with disabilities.
The Essay proceeds in the following way. Parts I and II trace the evolution of selected22 health and tax policies impacting family caregivers
over the past fifty years. Part I focuses on Medicaid and the growth of
supports for home and community-based care. Part II describes the difficulty of care exclusion and the administrative and policy complications
that have developed since its enactment. The story shows the entwining
of health and tax policy and the need for advocates and policymakers to
consider unified rather than siloed solutions.
Part III critiques the difficulty of care exclusion as currently
administered on both procedural and substantive grounds. Finally, the
Essay reveals what lessons the difficulty of care saga might offer for
legislators considering how to design financial caregiving supports in the
context of a national caregiving strategy. Ultimately, this Essay argues
that Congress should reconsider tax laws supporting community
integration and care in light of the realities of modern health programs
and in light of contemporary health and disability policy. The IRS’s 2014
reinterpretation of § 131 attempted to correct course, but ultimately, only
Congress can fix siloed, outdated, and paternalistic policies.

22. There are myriad federal and state policies impacting adults with disabilities and family
caregivers. This Essay focuses on Medicaid on the health care side and the difficulty of care exclusion on the tax side.
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I. MEDICAID, DISABILITY RIGHTS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORTS
FOR IN-HOME AND COMMUNITY CARE
Most paid long-term care23 services and supports in the United States
are funded by the Medicaid program.24 This Part briefly describes the
structure and evolution of Medicaid as it relates to adults with disabilities
and their caregivers.25
Medicaid is a needs-based, federally funded health program
historically serving eligible families with children, older adults, and
persons with disabilities.26 For individuals with disabilities who require
23. Long-term care consists of services and supports (commonly referred to as LTSS, long-term
services and supports) “for older adults and people with disabilities who need support because of
age; physical, cognitive, developmental, or chronic health conditions; or other functional limitations that restrict their abilities to care for themselves.” LTSS Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/American-Indian-Alaska-Native/AIAN/LTSS-TA-Center/info/ltss-overview [https://perma.cc/NQ4D-3DY4] (Sept. 30, 2020).
See also What is Long-Term Care?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/whatlong-term-care [https://perma.cc/NL8Q-PLD3] (May 1, 2017) (“The most common type of longterm care is personal care—help with everyday activities, also called ‘activities of daily living.’
These activities include bathing, dressing, grooming, using the toilet, eating, and moving around—
for example, getting out of bed and into a chair.”).
24. Molly O’Malley Watts et al., Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Enrollment
and Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/medicaid-home-and-community-based-services-enrollment-and-spending/
[https://perma.cc/C9V8-GBYW]. However, it should be acknowledged that the vast majority of
caregivers (tens of millions of people) are unpaid or underpaid family members. There are more
than two million paid home care workers in the United States, according to estimates based on
census and Bureau of Labor Statistics data. See U.S. Home Care Workers: Key Facts, PHI 2 (2019),
https://phinational.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/phi-home-care-workers-key-facts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UBF-9HT2]. In contrast, studies suggest that around forty million people provide uncompensated care. See Caregiving Statistics: Demographics, FAM. CAREGIVER ALL. (Apr.
17, 2019), https://www.caregiver.org/caregiver-statistics-demographics [https://perma.cc/UXX758J6]; see also GARY SMITH ET AL., OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., USING MEDICAID TO SUPPORT WORKING AGE ADULTS
WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES IN THE COMMUNITY: A HANDBOOK 10 (2005) [hereinafter
ASPE HANDBOOK] (“It is estimated that between one-quarter and one-third of adults with serious
mental illnesses reside with their family, usually a parent.”); Caregiving for Family and Friends—
A Public Health Issue, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/aging/caregiving/caregiver-brief.html [https://perma.cc/GGD2-Y2TR] (July 30, 2019) [hereinafter
CDC Caregiver Brief] (discussing the health hazards associated with providing unpaid caregiving
services to a friend or family member and its impact on public health).
25. Medicaid is an incredibly complex program with volumes of arcane rules and many separate
programs. This Essay will necessarily summarize provisions relevant to the difficulty of care exclusion; it does not attempt to provide a comprehensive description of Medicaid law or a complete
history of the program.
26. See Eligibility, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, https://www.macpac.gov/medicaid-101/eligibility/ [https://perma.cc/WM8E-8UU3] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021); see
generally
MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Q8UB-RT9C] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). In contrast, Medicare is an old age and
disability insurance program funded through payroll taxes. How Is Medicare Funded?,
MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-is-medicare-funded
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long-term services, Medicaid provides a crucial safety net.27 While
Medicaid’s eligibility limits exclude many people, 28 its programs for
individuals with disabilities are a key component of the U.S.’s current
caregiving supports, particularly for lower income families.29

[https://perma.cc/M6EX-EKP3] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). For more information about the Medicare
program,
see
generally
MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/
[https://perma.cc/XHH8-YYP4] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). Medicare recipients may either be individuals who are disabled and meet certain conditions or individuals who have reached the age of
sixty-five. Who Is Eligible for Medicare?, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-andmedicaid/who-is-elibible-for-medicare/index.html [https://perma.cc/F35N-A9CE] (last visited Jan.
15, 2021). Some individuals qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid. Approximately 20% of Medicare beneficiaries are also enrolled in Medicaid. Eligibility, supra; see also Data Book: Beneficiaries Dually Eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N &
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N (2018), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Data-Book-Beneficiaries-Dually-Eligible-for-Medicare-and-Medicaid-January-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZP7-JKQQ].
27. As noted above, supra note 24, Medicaid is the primary payer of long-term care in the
United States. AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., ACCESS TO LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS: A 50STATE SURVEY OF MEDICAID FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS 1 (2010) [hereinafter AARP,
LTSS
ACCESS],
https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/i44-access-ltss_revised.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QSJ-EC24]. Contrary to popular belief, Medicare does not generally cover nursing home care, although it does cover some home health care. See, e.g., How Can I Pay for Nursing
Home Care?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/what-part-a-covers/how-can-i-pay-for-nursing-home-care [https://perma.cc/8NM9-Y96R] (last visited Jan. 15,
2021). Private long-term care disability insurance is unaffordable or unavailable for many people
and provides inadequate coverage in many cases even if purchased. Long-Term Care Insurance
Facts, AM. ASS’N LONG-TERM CARE INS., https://www.aaltci.org/long-term-care-insurance/learning-center/ltcfacts.php [https://perma.cc/GD3A-YYMP] (last visited Feb. 1, 2021) (indicating that
the average annual premium for a couple over the age of 65 was $4,675 and 44% of applicants
between ages 70 and 79 were denied coverage); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 25–26 & nn.95–101, 27 (2004) (noting that private insurance “fails
to cover the services people with disabilities most need for independence and health”).
28. See Stephanie R. Hoffer, Making the Law More ABLE: Reforming Medicaid for Disability,
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1255, 1269–70 (2015).
29. For federal fiscal year 2013, 4.2 million people received Medicaid-funded long-term services and supports worth $171.7 billion. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N.,
MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP DATA BOOK 57 (2018) [hereinafter MACPAC MACSTATS],
https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/December-2018-MACStats-DataBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3HW-F7QP]. See also CMS Fast Facts, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-systems/cms-fast-facts/cms-fastfacts-mobile-site [https://perma.cc/7FMX-YJCA] (Aug. 20, 2020, 3:21 PM) (tabulating 1.6 million
beneficiaries of home health services under Medicaid in 2014 worth approximately $4.8 billion for
the states and territories that provided complete or partial information); Medicaid Facts and Figures, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicaid-facts-and-figures [https://perma.cc/BY4D-5VF4] (“In 2017, Medicaid
paid for 30.2 percent of expenditures for nursing care facilities and continuing care retirement communities.”).
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A. Medicaid’s Early Days
The Medicaid program was created in 1965,30 providing federal
financial support for health care services to qualifying poor, elderly, and
disabled individuals.31 Medicaid is a complex federal-state partnership
program.32 State Medicaid programs are designed and managed by state
agencies within federal parameters. Federal law establishes mandatory
coverage groups (like children), optional coverage groups (most recently,
people who need COVID-19 testing33 ), and mandatory and optional
services that can be provided to those groups.34 Within this wide menu
of options, states submit a “state plan” for approval by the federal Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).35 States can also customize
their Medicaid programs through various waivers, which provide further
options to deviate from standard parameters.36 Because states have such
flexibility in designing their programs, Medicaid programs vary
30. Medicaid was enacted as title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA), Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 343–52 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et
seq.).
31. See Diane Rowland & Rachel Garfield, Health Care for the Poor: Medicaid at 35, 22
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 23, 23 (2000).
32. For a comprehensive overview of the Medicaid program, see Medicaid 101, MEDICAID &
CHIP
PAYMENT
&
ACCESS
COMM’N,
https://www.macpac.gov/medicaid-101/
[https://perma.cc/64YW-FX5C]. See also Robin Rudowitz et al., 10 Things to Know about Medicaid: Setting the Facts Straight, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/10-things-to-know-about-medicaid-setting-the-facts-straight/
[https://perma.cc/DTH63E46].
33. CMS Issued New Guidance for States on the Medicaid Optional Uninsured COVID-19 Testing (XXIII) Group, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (June 4, 2020), https://www.aha.org/special-bulletin/202006-04-cms-issued-new-guidance-states-medicaid-optional-uninsured-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/R25M-74HL].
34. See Eligibility, supra note 26 (“Some eligibility groups are mandated by federal law and
others may be covered at state option.”); Benefits, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS
COMM’N, https://www.macpac.gov/medicaid-101/benefits/ [https://perma.cc/7M7D-UHCP] (“As
with Medicaid eligibility groups, some Medicaid benefits that states offer are mandatory and others
are optional.”); see also Joint HHS, HUD, & USDA Informational Bulletin, Living at Home in
Rural America: Improving Accessibility for Older Adults and People with a Disability 4 (Aug. 19,
2020),
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib081920.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y79T-E24W] (detailing the flexible options for states to cover a variety of optional in-home services through Medicaid).
35. See Joint HHS, HUD, & USDA Informational Bulletin, supra note 34, at 4; Social Security
Act § 1902(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.10–430.25 (2021); see also State Plan,
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/state-plan/
[https://perma.cc/9E5V-PVWP] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020); MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Medicaid
Financial Eligibility for Seniors and People with Disabilities: Findings from a 50-State Survey,
KAISER FAM. FOUND 1 (2019) http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Medicaid-Financial-Eligibility-for-Seniors-and-People-with-Disabilities-Findings-from-a-50-State-Survey
[https://perma.cc/3YVZ-MCC3] (“Aside from the core group of SSI beneficiaries, pathways to full
Medicaid eligibility based on old age or disability are provided at state option.”).
36. See generally Waivers, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N,
https://www.macpac.gov/topics/waivers/ [https://perma.cc/7698-REVZ] (last visited Sept. 21,
2020).
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significantly from state to state.37
Most institutional long-term care is a mandatory service within
Medicaid and has been from the enactment of the program in 1965.38 In
contrast, equivalent care in community settings is still largely an optional
service, and one frequently provided through a waiver.39 Only two longterm services and supports must be provided under a Medicaid state plan:
nursing home and home health services.40 Mandatory “home health
services” are medical services; they are not required to fund supports for
activities of daily living, like dressing, eating, bathing, or toileting.41
Practically speaking, this means that Medicaid cannot turn away a person
who qualifies for Medicaid-funded nursing home care. But if that person
prefers to stay in her home,42 she may face an uphill battle getting all the
supports that she needs. The state could potentially enact caps, wait lists,
or even deny care altogether.43 Thus, for eligible beneficiaries, federal
37. For example, childbirth education classes are covered for pregnant persons in some states
but not in others. Kathy Gifford et al., Medicaid Coverage of Pregnancy and Perinatal Benefits:
Results from a State Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 4 tbl.1 (Apr. 2017), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/report/medicaid-coverage-of-pregnancy-and-perinatal-benefits-results-from-astate-survey/ [https://perma.cc/DPK2-P2DD].
38. State Medicaid plans were and are required to cover inpatient hospital services and skilled
nursing home services, except that these services were optional if provided in a mental institution
or tuberculosis facility. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 § 121, 79 Stat.
286, 344, 351–52.
39. See Carli Friedman et al., Aging in Place: A National Analysis of Home- and CommunityBased Medicaid Services for Older Adults, 29 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 245, 253–54 (2018)
(discussing institutional bias within the Medicaid program, noting that services in nursing facilities
are often mandatory while home and community-based services are mostly optional for states to
cover); see also Joint HHS, HUD, & USDA Informational Bulletin, supra note 34, at 5–7 (describing seven optional Medicaid programs and benefits that help the elderly and people with disabilities
remain in their homes).
40 . MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
MEDICAID AND CHIP 50 (2014) [hereinafter MACPAC LTSS REPORT].
41. “Home health services must include nursing, home health aides, and medical supplies and
equipment. States may choose to provide additional therapeutic services under home health (occupational or physical therapy, speech pathology, and audiology) and determine the medical necessity
criteria by which home health service utilization is managed.” Id. (citations omitted). Obviously, a
much broader array of services and supports can be needed to manage activities of daily living.
42. Most people prefer to stay in their homes rather than move to a nursing home or other large
institution. See generally Candace Howes, Who Will Care for the Women?, 30 J. WOMEN POL. &
POL’Y 248, 249 (2009) (“Despite the fact that most people would prefer to remain in their homes,
half of paid care takes place in institutional settings . . . .”); AARP RESEARCH, 2018 HOME AND
COMMUNITY PREFERENCES SURVEY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADULTS AGE 18-PLUS 4 (2018),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/liv-com/2018/home-community-preferences-survey.doi.10.26419-2Fres.00231.001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9C6X-MMVW]
(“Between 50 and 60 percent of adults age 18–49 say they want to remain in their communities and
homes as they age, while nearly 80 percent of adults age 50 and older indicate this same desire.”).
43. Advocates have argued with limited success that such denials are a violation of the ADA.
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Medicaid dollars are automatically available for nursing home care, while
care sufficient to remain in one’s home and community may not be
covered.44
B. Health Policy Shifts Toward Community Living and Self-Direction
Medicaid’s development was influenced by the deinstitutionalization
and disability rights movement.45 In the 1950s through the 1970s, challenges and resistance arose to institutions housing individuals with disabilities.46 By 1967, nearly 200,000 people with developmental disabilities and mental illnesses lived in institutions in the United States.47
Since the early 1970s, many states have moved away from institutionalization of individuals with disabilities in favor of community placements,48 often recognizing that disabled individuals’ autonomy and quality of life had been severely and unnecessarily limited under prior state
See Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 270 (2004) (using a Seventh Circuit decision
as inspiration for a discussion of whether the lack of sufficient HCBS placements violates the
ADA’s integrated-settings duty); David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services,
26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 795 (2010) (arguing that a denial of in-home services violates the U.S.
Constitution, in addition to the ADA); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (“[D]einstitutionalization advocates have
moved from the due process theories on which they relied in the 1970s and 1980s to an anti-discrimination theory relying on the ADA and Olmstead.”).
44. See Friedman et al., supra note 39, at 245, 253–54 (discussing institutional bias within the
Medicaid program, noting that services in nursing facilities are often mandatory while home and
community-based services are mostly optional for states to cover).
45. “The American disability rights movement is based on a philosophy of independent living.
That philosophy supports policies that ensure that people with disabilities have the opportunity to
participate fully in society and control the day-to-day and minute-to-minute aspects of their lives.”
Brief of the American Ass’n of People with Disabilities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681). A significant body of scholarship explores the disability rights movement. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS,
CONTRADICTIONS]. In-depth treatment of this scholarship or of the history of the movement is
beyond the scope of this Essay.
46. See Parallels in Time: A History of Developmental Disabilities, MINN. DEP’T ADMIN.:
PARALLELS IN TIME, https://mn.gov/mnddc/parallels/index.html [https://perma.cc/X677-57V6]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2021). See also Deborah S. Metzel & Pamela M. Walker, The Illusion of
Inclusion: Geographies of the Lives of People with Developmental Disabilities in the United States,
21 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 114, 126 (2001) (“[D]einstitutionalization began in the late 1960s spurred
by lawsuits, exposes, and efforts by people with disabilities, parents, and professionals.” (citation
omitted)).
47. Metzel & Walker, supra note 46, at 125 (“People continued to be institutionalized with the
number of people increasing from a little over 115,000 in 1946 to nearly 200,000 in 1967, ‘nearly
twice the rate of increase in the general population.’ In the mid- to late-1960s, federal legislation
provided funds for new construction of institutions. Eventually these residents were the ones who
constituted the great deinstitutionalization movement in the next two decades.” (citation omitted)).
48. DEWAYNE
L.
DAVIS
ET
AL.,
NAT’L CONF.
STATE
LEGISLATORS,
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL
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practices.49 In 1981, Congress established the home and communitybased services (HCBS) waiver program50 under Medicaid, which permitted states to furnish a broad array of services in lieu of institutional care.51
However, these community-based alternatives to institutionalization
were not mandatory Medicaid services as most institutional services
were.52 They were also not incorporated into Medicaid state plans. Instead, states could offer HCBS services with CMS approval via a waiver
process.53
Despite this starting disadvantage, over time the disability rights
movement pushed policymakers at all levels, eventually accomplishing a
major shift toward more community integration options and greater selfdirection in programs for people with disabilities.54 The disability rights

ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 2 (2000), https://mn.gov/mnddc/parallels2/pdf/00s/00/00DPD-NCS.pdf [https://perma.cc/28UD-MS2U]. See AARP, LTSS ACCESS, supra note 27, at 1
(“Most Medicaid spending for [long-term services and supports] to older persons and adults with
disabilities is for nursing home services. States, however, are increasingly offering home and community-based services (HCBS) to persons who would otherwise be eligible for nursing home services.”); ASPE HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 7 (“Fifty years ago, government-funded mental
health services principally consisted of large state-run mental institutions, funded solely with state
funds. Community-based services—especially for low-income individuals—were scant and not
well-organized. . . . In the 1970s, . . . the ‘community support system’ (CSS) was formulated to
serve as a conceptual framework for supporting individuals with serious mental illnesses who are
especially reliant on mental health and other community support systems to live successfully in the
community.”).
49. See, e.g., Oregon and Georgia: Closing Institutions and Building Community Support Systems, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, https://ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sept192012/Oregon
[https://perma.cc/RJ4E-6MAC] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (“Our system of community-based supports is not perfect. . . . However, Oregonians with disabilities have some things today they didn’t
have 30 years ago at Fairview: freedom, dignity and a sense of belonging.” (quoting Sara Gelser,
Oregon State Representative)). See also Mary Jean Duckett & Mary R. Guy, Home and Community-Based Services Waivers, 22 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 123 (2000) (tracing the growth of HCBS
in the early 1980s and noting studies documenting unnecessary use of Medicaid institutional care).
50. Social Security Act of 1935, § 1915(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (authorizing waivers, within
certain parameters, permitting states to include home and community-based services in their Medicaid programs).
51. See MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 42. One important limitation on HCBS
funding is Medicaid’s prohibition on covering services provided in so-called “institution[s] for
mental diseases” if the beneficiary is under sixty-five years of age. See SSA § 1915(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n(a). This means that HCBS cannot “serve as an alternative to mental health institutional
services for working age adults with serious mental illnesses.” ASPE HANDBOOK, supra note 24,
at 53 (emphasis omitted). Despite this limitation, Medicaid programs are important mechanisms
for supporting community integration of many previously institutionalized people.
52. See Friedman et al., supra note 39, at 245.
53. See MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 51 (describing the waiver application, approval, and review process).
54. Consumer-controlled personal assistance services, in which individuals with disabilities
hire, fire, and direct the individuals who provide services to them, are a key means of making
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movement took a social and civil rights approach55 to integration, scoring
major litigation and legislative victories,56 including the 1990 enactment
of the landmark antidiscrimination law the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).57 Congress declared, “the Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals.”58
The values of community integration and self-direction for individuals
with disabilities were incorporated into many state Medicaid programs
during this time via a major boost from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation.59 As a condition of funding, the projects were required to
the philosophy of independent living a reality and preventing unnecessary institutionalization. Responding to the urgings of disability rights activists, changes in federal funding rules,
and this Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), states
have increasingly provided for consumer-controlled personal assistance services under their
Medicaid programs.
Brief of the American Ass’n of People with Disabilities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 45, at 2–3. See also Everette James & Meredith Hughes, Embracing the Role
of Family Caregivers in the U.S. Health System, HEALTH AFFS. (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160908.056387/full/ [https://perma.cc/3EY9JLTD] (“One of the clear trends emerging from U.S. health reform is the transition from a provider
and procedure focused system to one that puts the patient at the center of care. ‘Patient-centered
care’ is defined as ‘providing care that is respectful of, and responsive to, individual patient preferences, needs and values.’”); see also BAGENSTOS, CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 45, at 25 (“Independent living activists thus defined ‘independence’ as the ability of people with disabilities to
make their own choices concerning how to live their lives, what services to receive, and how and
where to receive them.”).
55. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483, 2485
(2011) [hereinafter Weber, Disability Rights] (explaining that activists and lawmakers justified the
ADA on civil rights and antipoverty grounds); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2003) [hereinafter
Bagenstos, ADA as Welfare Reform]. As with any other coalition, disability rights activists are not
a monolith. Within the movement (and within the disability community) are differing perspectives
and policy positions.
56. See Part One: The Reawakening 1950–1980: Litigation and Legislation, MINN. DEPT.
ADMIN.:
PARALLELS
IN
TIME,
https://mn.gov/mnddc/parallels/five/5d/1.html
[https://perma.cc/Y58P-3ZYJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021) (listing selected legislative and litigation
victories of the disability rights movement).
57. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101). The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public services, public accommodations, and telecommunications.
58. Id. § 2. Professor Bagenstos points out, however, that ADA reflects multiple goals including
the less lofty desire to save the public fisc the “cost of dependency.” Bagenstos, ADA as Welfare
Reform, supra note 55, at 927, 957.
59. The Foundation funded “self-determination” pilot projects in eighteen states during the
1990s and later funded three “Cash & Counseling” demonstration projects. See JANET O’KEEFFE
ET AL., NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED SERVS., DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING
SELF-DIRECTION PROGRAMS AND POLICIES: A HANDBOOK 1-18, 2-2 (2010) [hereinafter
O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION], https://www.appliedselfdirection.com/sites/default/files/Participant%20Direction%20Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5K6-9RGP]; see also Medicaid Program;
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incorporate participant direction, giving more control over services to the
care recipient.60 Some states also adopted “consumer-directed” personal
care services as an optional state plan benefit.61
Nine years later, another crucial step in the evolution of Medicaid for
people with disabilities was the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Olmstead v. L.C.62 The Olmstead decision held that state services for
disabled individuals must be offered in the least restrictive setting
appropriate, under the ADA. 63 Many states now fulfill their Olmstead
responsibilities through their Medicaid programs.64
The Olmstead opinion offers a compelling articulation of the values
and social policy reflected in the ADA. 65 In oft-quoted language, the
Court recognized two “evident judgments” by Congress:
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit
from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life. Second, confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family
relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.66

After Olmstead, these policy judgments were reflected in the
authorization of additional Medicaid options and demonstration
programs. One of these was Money Follows the Person, a demonstration
program to help people leave institutions.67 States were also given new

Self-Directed Personal Assistance Services Program State Plan Option (Cash and Counseling), 73
Fed. Reg. 57,854, 57,855 (Oct. 3, 2008).
60. O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION, supra note 59, at 1–13 (describing the Cash & Counseling
Vision Statement); id. at 1–4 (“States that received C&C grants . . . agreed to make program design
choices in accordance with the C&C Vision Statement.”).
61. SSA § 1905(a)(24), 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)(24).
62. 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (“Specifically we confront the question whether the proscription
of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings
rather than in institutions.”).
63. Id. at 607.
64. See MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 43 (“The Olmstead ruling on state LTSS
policies has been a major factor in the increased use of HCBS.”).
65. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Taking Choice Seriously in Olmstead Jurisprudence, 40 J. LEGAL
MED. 5, 5 (2020) (“Olmstead has often been called the Brown v. Board of Education of the disability rights movement.”).
66. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600–01 (citations omitted).
67. See Money Follows the Person, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/longterm-services-supports/money-follows-person/index.html [https://perma.cc/6FTV-QSDD] (last
visited Jan. 16, 2021). Money Follows the Person has been extended several times, including in the
CARES Act. Id. See also Pam Katz, Important Step for Community Living for People with Disabilities: Congress Makes Overdue Investment in Money Follows the Person Program, ARC
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options to incorporate self-directed home and community-based services
into their Medicaid programs.68 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) acknowledged that the new options were “built on the
experiences and lessons learned from the disability rights movement and
States that pioneered self-direction programs.”69 The agency proclaimed,
“self-direction is an important component of independence, as it
promotes quality, access, and choice.”70
Today there are seemingly endless options for states to use Medicaid
funds or separate state funds to support community life for individuals
with disabilities.71 This is partly because the Social Security Act (SSA)
allows for waiver and for some optional services to deviate from the
normal Medicaid requirements, such as comparability of services.72 This
allows states to develop unique programs specifically for individuals with
certain diagnoses, for instance developmental disabilities.73 This can be
beneficial for the individuals with a customized program available to
them, but it creates mind-boggling complexity, as each Medicaid option
has its own detailed scope and requirements.74 Also, states may operate
multiple programs under a single legal provision.75 Moreover, it is still
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://thearc.org/important-step-for-community-living-for-people-with-disabilities-congress-makes-overdue-investment-in-money-follows-the-person-program/
[https://perma.cc/BQF3-YAMF].
68. These options are found in SSA sections 1915(i) (State Plan Home and Community-Based
Services), (j) (Self-Directed Personal Assistance Services under State Plan), and (k) (Community
First Choice), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i), (j), and (k). The section 1915(i) option was a particularly significant addition. Unlike section 1915(c) waivers, section 1915(i) waivers could serve people who
did not (yet) need an institutional level of care. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid,
CHIP & Surv. & Certification, to State Medicaid Dir. (Aug. 6, 2010), https://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/downloads/SMD10015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7C4-873V]. In the Affordable Care Act, Congress amended SSA section
1915(i) to increase the HCBS services available and to provide greater flexibility in program design. Id.
69. See Medicaid Program; Self-Directed Personal Assistance Services Program State Plan Option (Cash and Counseling), 73 Fed. Reg. 57,854, 57,854 (Oct. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 441).
70. Id. In this context, self-direction may include choice of setting and choice of care provider.
As discussed below, it can also mean that certain management responsibilities are shifted to the
beneficiary. See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. See generally Self-Directed Services,
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/long-term-services-supports/self-directedservices/index.html [https://perma.cc/8MMK-D9MT] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
71. MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 51–52.
72. ASPE HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 27; MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 51.
73. MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 58.
74. Id. at 51–52, 61–62. See, e.g., Medicaid Program; Community First Choice Option, 76 Fed.
Reg. 10,736, 10,736-53 (proposed Feb. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 441) (explaining
and proposing definitions, requirements, options, and other parameters for the Community First
Choice State plan option under SSA section 1915(k)).
75. For example, California currently has six active waivers under SSA section 1915(c) alone.
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up to each state to voluntarily amend its state plan or seek a waiver to
take up any of the HCBS options. States choosing to take up an HCBS
option have significant leeway in determining financial eligibility criteria
for those programs.76
C. Administrative Complexity Grows as Community Care Programs
Develop
As Medicaid programs shifted away from institutionalization and
toward community care for people with disabilities, the administration of
these programs changed and diversified. 77 Several developments are
notable in the context of this Essay. They concern (1) who can be a paid
caregiver, (2) who is the employer or responsible payer of the caregiver,
and (3) how administrative tasks relating to the caregiver’s hiring and
payment are handled.
Originally, most Medicaid-funded home care was provided by
professional employees of the state agency.78 As Medicaid services
increasingly reflected disability rights values of autonomy and selfdirection, states grew more receptive to individuals (as opposed to
agencies) being hired as caregivers, and eventually even family members
were allowed to be hired. 79 Today, federal Medicaid law generally

State Waivers List, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115demo/demonstration-and-waiver-list/index.html [https://perma.cc/5SRP-4HNU] (last visited Dec.
21, 2020). According to Medicaid.gov, there are currently more than three hundred HCBS Waiver
programs active nationwide. See Home & Community-Based Services 1915(c), MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/home-community-based-services/home-community-basedservices-authorities/home-community-based-services-1915c/index.html [https://perma.cc/23E696ZM] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020).
76. See AARP, LTSS ACCESS, supra note 27, at 3; see also Musumeci et al., supra note 35, at
21 (“While most states that expand financial eligibility for Medicaid nursing home and other institutional care also apply those same rules to HCBS, there are a few states in which HCBS financial
eligibility rules are more restrictive and could be aligned with those for institutional care to eliminate bias in favor of institutional care.”).
77. In addition to having flexibility around programs and services, state Medicaid programs
have significant flexibility in administration. O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION, supra note 59, at 2-20–
21.
78. Newcomer et al., supra note 79, at 518.
79. Id.; O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION, supra note 59 at 1-9–10. This policy change was made
easier by studies finding that family caregivers were cost-effective for the state. A study of California’s in-home services and supports (IHSS) program concluded, “[t]here were no financial disadvantages and some advantages to Medicaid in terms of lower average Medicaid expenditures and
fewer nursing home admissions when using spouses, parents, and other relatives as paid IHSS providers. This argues in favor of honoring the recipient’s and family’s preference for such providers.”
Robert J. Newcomer et al., Allowing Spouses to Be Paid Personal Care Providers: Spouse Availability and Effects on Medicaid-Funded Service Use and Expenditures, 52 GERONTOLOGIST 517,
517
(2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3530315/pdf/gnr102.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B4KB-KBG5].
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permits states to pay family members to care for disabled adults.80 While
some states still restrict who can receive caregiver payments for adults,
those states are now a minority.81
In addition to paying a broader range of caregivers, states’ financial
administration of their programs also changed as personal choice models
grew in popularity and complexity. Two aspects in particular stand out.
First, Medicaid agencies began to contract with third party companies not
only to manage services, but also to manage caregiver payments, often
including compliance activities like payroll and tax paperwork
obligations.82 Second, states shifted control and responsibilities to the
person receiving services, to various degrees.83 Generally, a contracted
fiscal manager84 would handle or assist the service recipient in handling
the administrative obligations connected to their care.
Administrative obligations are not uniform across states because the
employment status of Medicaid-funded caregivers can vary.85 Even for
caregivers who are treated as employees, the identity of the employer can

80. Newcomer et al., supra note 79, at 518; O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION, supra note 59, at 110.
81. Newcomer et al., supra note 79, at 518; O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION, supra note 59, at 19–10.
82 . See, e.g., Medicaid Program; Community First Choice Option, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,736,
10,742–43 (proposed Feb. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 441) (noting that under
§ 441.545, states may choose agency models or “agency with choice” models, which contain a
requirement for an internal or contracted “financial management entity” to “collect and process
timesheets of the individual’s workers; process payroll, withholding, filing and payment of applicable Federal, State and local employment related taxes and insurance; maintain a separate account
for each individual’s budget; track and report disbursements and balances of individual’s funds;
process and pay invoices for services in the service plan; and provide to the individual periodic
reports of expenditures and the status of the approved service budget”); In re Hite, 557 B.R. 451,
453 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2016) (noting that the caregiver-parents received Medicaid benefit payments
through the entity Public Partnership, LLC); Micorescu v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 796, 797
(1998) (“Petitioners were licensed . . . as Level III adult foster home providers and were . . . . an
instrumentality of the State of Oregon that acts as a social service agency responsible for providing
various services to individuals including determining eligibility for, and case management in,
[M]edicaid for elderly persons.”).
83. See generally SUZANNE CRISP ET AL., INTEGRATED CARE RES. CTR., SELECTED
PROVISIONS FROM INTEGRATED CARE RFPS AND CONTRACTS: PARTICIPANT DIRECTION (2014).
States generally use “a budget model, an employer authority model, or a combination of both” in
participant-directed Medicaid programs for long-term services and supports. Id. at 2.
84. There are various terms for these companies, including “fiscal intermediary” and “financial
management services” (FMS) entity, organization, provider, or agency. This Essay uses the term
“fiscal manager” as shorthand to encompass both fiscal/employer agents and FMS entities in programs operating under an “agency with choice” model.
85. See Certain Medicaid Waiver Payments May Be Excludable from Income, IRS
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/certain-medicaid-waiver-payments-may-be-excludable-from-income [https://perma.cc/8KNL-XU2C] (Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter IRS § 131 FAQ]; Amy B.
McLellan & John Tripp, Recovering FICA and Medicare Taxes for Family Caregivers, 156 TAX
NOTES 225, 226–27 (2017).
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vary.86 Some states contract with multiple fiscal management companies,
who may handle payments differently.87 Occasionally, caregivers may
even be treated as independent contractors.88
The IRS accommodated this complexity with updated guidance on
federal employment tax responsibilities related to caregivers. In Notice
2003-70, announcing a proposed revenue procedure, the IRS explained:
The proposed revenue procedure also addresses questions that have
arisen in light of another evolving aspect of the home-care service
industry. States now often engage third parties to participate in various
aspects of their home-care service programs, including processing
federal grants and administering payroll for home-care service
providers. . . . The Service recognizes that there are a variety of third
parties involved in these arrangements, some for-profit, some nonprofit,
and some public, and that the terms of the agreements between the states
and the third parties also vary.89

Consistent with shifts in Medicaid policy toward greater beneficiary
participation and control, many states adopt the posture that the beneficiary hires and employs the caregiver.90 For beneficiaries with very limited capacity like K.R., this is a fiction; for others it is a meaningful and

86. O’KEEFFE, SELF-DIRECTION, supra note 59 at 7-4. In some states, caregivers are employees
who receive a form W-2 from the state contractor that handles payroll for these programs statewide.
See e.g., IRS Notice 2014-7, Difficulty of Care Payments Excludable from Income, WASH. ST.
DEP’T SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., https://www.dshs.wa.gov/altsa/irs-notice-2014-7-difficulty-carepayments-excludable-income [https://perma.cc/ZD8K-46KS] (last visited Dec. 31, 2020) (showing
Washington DSHS uses contractor Public Partnerships Washington Individual ProviderOne
(IPOne) program to manage its filing requirements for individual care providers).
87. See CRISP ET AL., supra note 83, at 7 (describing three main accountability responsibilities
of financial management services providers, including managing tax requirements, and typical arrangements between states and providers ranging from delegation to collaboration). See also infra
note 178 (describing agencies handling difficulty of care payments differently in the wake of IRS
Notice 2014-7).
88. See IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85; McLellan & Tripp, supra note 85, at 226. The classification of an individual as an employee or an independent contractor is dependent on several factors,
and the distinction has significant consequences, from workers’ rights to tax treatment. See 19
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:2 (4th ed. 2020); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M.
Ring, Tax Law’s Workplace Shift, 100 B.U. L. REV. 651, 666–79 (2020).
89. I.R.S. Notice 2003-70, 2003-43 I.R.B. 916, 916. The procedures were later finalized in Rev.
Proc. 2013-39, 2013-52 I.R.B. 830.
90. I.R.S. Notice 2003-70, 2003-43 I.R.B. 916, 916; JANET O’KEEFFE ET AL., OFF. OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES: A PRIMER 195–98 (2010) [hereinafter
ASPE
PRIMER],
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/76201/primer10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26SM-KVDM]. In other programs, the fiscal manager is considered the caregiver’s employer. See PAMELA NADASH & SUZANNE CRISP, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., BEST PRACTICES IN CONSUMER DIRECTION 31 (2005), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/177236/CMS-CDBestPractices.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNS5-MZ9D].
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important feature of the program. Regardless, IRS Notice 2003-70 addresses programs that designate the beneficiary as employer by adopting
a principal/agent framework for the relationship between the person receiving care and the fiscal manager.91 Under this framework, the person
receiving care is legally responsible for the employment tax obligations
that accrue to any employer (e.g., withholding income tax, withholding
and paying FICA, and filing a W-2 for the caregiver), but these duties are
delegated to the fiscal manager.92 In reality, the state Medicaid agency
contracts with the fiscal management company93 as it is not reasonable
to expect Medicaid beneficiaries to individually vet and hire payroll firms
to deal with their caregivers’ payments. Also, of course, the actual money
to pay the caregiver comes through the state agency to the fiscal provider,
not from the Medicaid recipient’s personal resources.94
D. Medicaid Coverage for Caregivers
Medicaid originally was not available to nonelderly caregivers of
disabled adults.95 Since the implementation of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) in 2014,96 however, Medicaid has become a path for low-income
caregivers to access health care. 97 The ACA’s expanded Medicaid
coverage group includes most individuals with income up to 138% of the

91. I.R.S. Notice 2003-70, supra note 90, at 921.
92. Id. at 916. Medicaid programs are generally required to offer financial management services
to beneficiaries in participant-directed programs. See ASPE PRIMER, supra note 90, at 182 tbl.7-1.
As noted above, states may contract with outside vendors to serve as fiscal managers. See NADASH
& CRISP, supra note 90, at 32.
93. See CRISP ET AL., supra note 83, at 2.
94. Medicaid generally does not allow cash payments to beneficiaries for use in paying providers directly. See ASPE PRIMER, supra note 90, at 182.
95. Rowland & Garfield, supra note 31, at 29 (“For adults who are not pregnant or disabled,
eligibility is limited to parents with very low incomes . . . . Adults without children are ineligible
for Medicaid coverage, no matter how poor, unless they qualify as disabled individuals.”). Parents
and caretakers of minor children could be covered, but not caretakers of adult children. See Medicaid’s Role for Women, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1–2 (Mar. 2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Medicaids-Role-for-Women [https://perma.cc/58QM-Q92M] (describing Medicaid’s categories of eligibility before and after the ACA). As there was no mandatory or optional
coverage category for low-income adults without children, states could only cover those individuals
through an SSA section 1115 demonstration waiver, resulting in relatively few such individuals
enrolled. See ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 10–11 (2002),
https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/mrbeligibility.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ND75K2ZT].
96. The term “ACA” refers globally to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (PPACA) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, as amended. While the ACA was enacted in
2010, its provisions were gradually rolled out over the next four years, achieving full implementation of most provisions in 2014.
97. See infra notes 133–148 and accompanying text.
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federal poverty line (FPL).98 The ACA originally conceived of this as a
new mandatory coverage group under Medicaid state plans. However, in
2012 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states could opt out of the
Medicaid expansion.99 As of February 2021, thirty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have adopted a Medicaid expansion.100
E. Summary
Since Medicaid’s enactment in 1965, state-sponsored programs caring
for individuals with disabilities have evolved in several ways. States
generally moved away from emphasizing medical and institutional care
provided by state employees who were not related to the beneficiary,
toward emphasizing participant direction and choice. Today, state
programs frequently utilize family members as caregivers, depending on
the care recipient’s preference. In addition, a complex administrative
system has evolved, wherein private fiscal managers may handle tax,
payroll, and administrative obligations for a range of programs. Federal
law provides incredible flexibility and options for a state to design its own
Medicaid system, which provides opportunities for innovation but also
presents many challenges.101
In the example of Ms. Reilly and K.R., depending on where they live
and which program they enroll in, they could be treated very differently
for tax and employment purposes. K.R. might be considered the employer
98. PPACA § 2001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). There are a few other requirements, such as citizenship and lack of Medicare eligibility. The income limit for the Medicaid expansion population is technically 133% FPL, but there is a five-percentage-point disregard, so the
practical limit is 138% FPL. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(I); 42 C.F.R. § 435.603(d)(1), (d)(4) (2019).
See also the discussion in the Preambles to the Proposed Rule at 78 Fed. Reg.4,594, 4,625–26 (Jan.
22, 2013) and the Final Rule at 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 42,186–88 (July 15, 2013). For 2020, that
limit was $23,791 ($17,240 × 138%) per year for a family of two. See Annual Update of the HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 85 Fed. Reg. 3,060, 3,060 (Jan. 17, 2020) (setting the 2020 poverty guideline
for the contiguous United States at $17,240 for a family of two).
99. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
100. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-theaffordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/BXY9-ZLX2] (Feb. 22, 2021); see also Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/ [https://perma.cc/9P4R-Z8Y4] (mapping state Medicaid expansion status); Louise Norris, Find Medicaid Coverage in your State, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.healthinsurance.org/medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/4X42-9SX3].
101. Researchers have observed that the current “patchwork of services and eligibility policies”
is confusing, not well coordinated, and can lead to impeded access to services; fundamentally these
legal and administrative complexities “complicate the task of designing a more rational and efficient system of LTSS.” MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 61–62. See also ASPE
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 2 (“Because of the great flexibility afforded states in program design,
there are essentially 51 unique state Medicaid programs.”).
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of Ms. Reilly, even if she does not have the cognitive capacity to hire and
fire her caregiver. Or K.R. could be seen as a third-party beneficiary of a
contract between the state agency (or its contractor) and Ms. Reilly. In
addition, Ms. Reilly might be treated as an employee (of K.R., the state,
or a contracted entity), or she might be treated as an independent
contractor.
Although it was prompted in part by the desire to center the beneficiary
and return some autonomy to people with disabilities, many of whom had
previously been institutionalized, the legal and administrative complexity
of government in-home care programs will prove to be a significant
obstacle to providing uniform tax treatment for family caregivers. Part II
of this essay explores these obstacles, and the relationship between tax
policy, tax administration, and family caregiving, through the example of
the § 131 difficulty of care exclusion.
II. AT THE INTERSECTION OF TAXATION AND CAREGIVING: THE
“DIFFICULTY OF CARE” GROSS INCOME EXCLUSION
Parallel to the health care policy and disability rights story recounted
above, we find a tax story.102 As disability advocates were pushing for
more community programs and greater involvement in decision-making
regarding their care, the tax system was also changing.
This Part first describes the origins of the difficulty of care exclusion.
Second, this Part reveals the changing impact of the exclusion on
caregivers in the four decades following its enactment. Third, this Part
reviews a series of attempts to apply the difficulty of care exclusion both
to our contemporary system of disability supports and to family
caregivers.
A. Early Development and Codification of the “Foster Care” Gross
Income Exclusion
The difficulty of care exclusion grew out of the child foster care
system. In addition to “standard” foster payments, some states provided
additional payments to foster parents of children with disabilities who
required special caregiving time and effort.103 While we do not know the
precise rationale for each program, it appears that in some cases payments
were seen as an incentive to recruit needed foster families.104 Payments
102. The line between health policy and tax is already somewhat blurred, as the developments
examined in Section I.C., supra, show.
103. See James D. Culley et al., Public Payments for Foster Care, 22 SOC. WORK 219, 221
(1977) (showing wide variability among states and sometimes within states of payment rates and
factors influencing payment rates, such as special mental or physical health needs).
104. See Alice Bussiere, Federal Adoption Assistance for Children with Special Needs, 19
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may also have been in recognition of the time and of the physical, mental,
and emotional labor that caregiving requires.
Since at least 1952, the IRS has provided guidance on the tax treatment
of state payments to foster parents.105 On the theory that the payments
reimburse foster parents for the expenses incurred as a result of taking in
a foster child, the IRS opined that foster payments are not gross income
except to the extent they exceed foster care expenses.106
This guidance left foster parents vulnerable to an audit, where they
would have to account for all their expenses connected with a foster child
in order to exclude the payments from their income. In the 1970s, the IRS
audited several of these foster care parents in the state of Minnesota.107
In response to these audits, Senator David Durenberger proposed what is
now § 131 of the Internal Revenue Code, creating an exclusion from
gross income for certain foster care payments. On the floor of the Senate,
Senator Durenberger decried the negative publicity from the audits as
“damaging to the cause of foster care—they have a chilling effect on
those considering being a foster parent of a handicapped child.”108 He
went on to explain the legislation:
With this bill the Senate is declaring that these payments made to
foster care parents over and above those payments made for
nonhandicapped children are not income to the parents, regardless of
whether they, dollar for dollar only cover expenses. [These] parents are
saving the taxpayers’ money by preventing institutionalization of these
children. But more importantly, they are providing a sense of belonging,
a sense of love and family to society’s most vulnerable children—those
with handicaps but without parents to provide them this love.109

As initially enacted, § 131 created an exclusion from gross income for
two categories of foster care payments: (1) payments made to reimburse
foster parents for expenses, and (2) “difficulty of care payments”—
compensation for providing additional care required by reason of the
foster child’s disability.110 The original § 131 only applied to minor
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587, 587–88 (1985) (describing the financial demand of caring for a child
with special needs as an impediment to adoption of foster children with disabilities). See also 128
Cong. Rec. S26905 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
105. See I.T. 4068, 1952-1 C.B. 7 § 22(a) (restated in Rev. Rul. 77-280, 1977-2 C.B. 14) (advising that where reimbursements to foster parents do not exceed expenses, “neither the expenditures nor the reimbursements need be reflected in the foster parents' Federal income tax returns”).
106. Id.
107. See 128 Cong. Rec. S26905 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (noting IRS audits of families examined whether payments were to cover expenses or compensate for
services).
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 131, 96 Stat. 2605, 2606–07 (1983).
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foster children. Also, if a foster parent were audited, they111 would still
need a detailed accounting of expenses for any foster payments not
designated by the state or foster care agency as “difficulty of care”
payments.112
However, within a few years, Congress amended the statute as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, eliminating the documentation requirements
and extending the gross income exclusion to “adult foster care” in
community settings with up to five care recipients. 113 The conference
committee report succinctly explains:
The conferees intend that this extension of the exclusion to adult foster
care is limited to cases of individuals who provide foster care within
their own homes to adults who have been placed in their care by an
agency of the State or political subdivision thereof specifically
designated as responsible for such function.114

This history of § 131 supports the interpretation that its purpose was to
encourage community care of individuals with disabilities. However, the
exclusion for “difficulty of care” payments was clearly built on the child
foster care framework. Section 131 merely extends that framework to
programs supporting in-home care of adults with disabilities. Because of
the initial focus on foster care, it is unclear whether Congress anticipated
providing any benefit to the biological parents of adults with disabilities.
The legislative history also lacks any indication of whether Congress
recognized the potential impact of the gross income exclusion on
caregivers’ ability to claim refundable tax credits, which Congress had
recently begun to employ.115 Both of these issues became important to
individuals with disabilities and their caregivers as tax and health care
law and administration changed in the ensuing decades.
B. Impact of Gross Income Exclusions Then and Now
1. The Evolution of Social Benefit Programs Toward Administration
Through the Tax Code
When the difficulty of care exclusion was created, it was likely in most
caregivers’ interests to have an exclusion from gross income.116 Since
111. This Essay intentionally utilizes the gender-neutral singular pronouns, they and them.
112. See § 131, 96 Stat. at 2606–07.
113. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1707, 100 Stat. 2085, 2781–82.
114 . H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-838–39 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4927.
115. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 25 (2006).
116. Except, perhaps, for caregivers who lacked sufficient Social Security credits to receive
Social Security and Medicare benefits. Technically, income tax liability is independent of liability
for Social Security and Medicare taxes. That is, one can be obligated to pay employment taxes on
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then however, the impact of a gross income exclusion has changed, as
Congress has significantly increased the menu and generosity of incomebased refundable credits available through the federal income tax
system.117 The decision to structure refundable credits to benefit those
with income would become a key factor in the dispute over the difficulty
of care exclusion.
For tax year 1986, the earned income tax credit (EITC) provided a
maximum benefit of $800, and a taxpayer received the maximum benefit
with $5,714 of annual earned income.118 In the late 1990s and even more
in the 2000s, Congress began to shift the bulk of our nation’s public
benefits from direct social benefit programs administered by benefit
agencies to the tax system.119 Welfare and food stamp benefits were cut
severely, as “welfare to work” and the “contract with America” became

payments that are excluded from gross income under § 61. See I.R.C. § 3121(a) (defining wages
for purposes of FICA tax under § 3101); IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85. However, in practice
employment taxes are not always properly paid if the income is not taxable, perhaps because of
confusion over the legal requirements. See, e.g., McLellan & Tripp, supra note 85, at 229 n.19
(apparently misreading IRS website FAQ, IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85). Lack of Social Security
and Medicare payments contributes to the impoverishment of family caregivers, as they may not
qualify for retirement, disability, or medical benefits later in life. Kaplan, Family Caregiving, supra
note 16, at 630–31.
117. See Batchelder et al., supra note 115, at 25 (“Prior to 1975, all individual tax incentives
were structured as deductions or exclusions or, occasionally, as non-refundable tax credits. Today
refundable credits are more widespread, accounting for about 18% of the roughly $500 billion in
tax incentives.”); Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 875, 876–
77 (2018) [hereinafter Tahk, New Welfare Rights]; see also Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is
Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67,
70 (2013).
118. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107. See also GENE
FALK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31768, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): AN OVERVIEW
16 (2014). For reference, $800 in 1986 is about $1,837 in 2019 dollars, and $5,714 in 1986 is about
$13,446 in 2019 dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/2WDR-6QS6] (last visited
Dec. 27, 2020). In contrast, for tax year 2019 both the maximum EITC available and the maximum
income level were much higher. See infra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
119 . See Tahk, New Welfare Rights, supra note 117, at 878–79. See also MARGOT L.
CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44825, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC):
A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 6 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44825.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/HY6J-KS96] (showing growth in EITC dollar amounts and recipients over time).
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catchphrases.120 In contrast, refundable tax credits grew substantially.121
Consistent with the “welfare to work” philosophy that partially motivated
the expansion of refundable credits, Congress generally requires
taxpayers to have “earned income” in order to qualify for (and to
maximize) refundable credits.122
The shift to providing economic supports to low-income individuals
and families through the tax code has been decried by some,123 but others
have pointed to benefits including efficiency and increased labor market
participation by low-income single mothers.124 The earned income tax
credit has been described as the “single most effective means tested

120. See NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT
GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 66–67 (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (outlining the key changes, including the restructuring of
benefits programs, introduced in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act—which, at the time, had yet to pass Congress); Kathleen Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling
All of the People Some of the Time: 1990s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values,
4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 24–27 (1996) (discussing “welfare to work” programs and generally
criticizing welfare reforms proposed in the 1990s). See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (exemplifying the
1990s shift toward ending the “entitlement” status of welfare benefits by implementing work requirements and similar restrictions).
121. Earned Income Tax Credit Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (July 15, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/earned-income-tax-credits-for-workingfamilies.aspx [https://perma.cc/FT22-9MQ6]. In addition to the federal benefit, thirty states now
offer their own EITC. Id. See also CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 119, at 6 (tracking the significant growth of the number of EITC recipients since inception through 2015).
122. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (defining “earned income” for the taxable year as “wages, salaries,
tips, and other employee compensation” includible in gross income plus any “net earnings from
self-employment”); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 24 (considering earned income when calculating the refundable portion of the child tax credit). See also Elaine Maag, Refundable Credits: The Earned Income
Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit, TAX POL’Y CTR. 1–2 (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/refundable-credits-earned-income-tax-credit-and-child-tax-credit/full
[https://perma.cc/6BFW-5LMA]; Value of Child Benefits at Various Income Levels, 2010, TAX
POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 2, 2010), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/value-child-benefits-various-income-levels-2010 [https://perma.cc/LQ2P-ZABD] (showing that refundable benefits were
maximized around $20,000 in earnings).
123. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance
and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1051–52 (2003); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million
Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 274, 280–81
(2002).
124. See, e.g., Chuck Marr et al., EITC and Child Tax Credit Promote Work, Reduce Poverty,
and Support Children’s Development, Research Finds, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/eitc-and-child-tax-credit-promote-workreduce-poverty-and-support-childrens [https://perma.cc/J99V-JY97] [hereinafter Marr et al., EITC
& CTC]; Chuck Marr et al., Expanding Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit Would
Benefit More Than 10 Million Rural Residents, Strongly Help Rural Areas, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/expanding-childtax-credit-and-earned-income-tax-credit-would-benefit-more-than
[https://perma.cc/4PVHTFLR]. See also Batchelder et al., supra note 115, at 27 (“[U]niform refundable credits represent
the most efficient type of tax incentive . . . .”).
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federal antipoverty program for working-age households . . . .”125 This
credit can result in significantly negative income tax liability for lowincome families with earned income.126
For tax year 2019, the average EITC benefit was $2,476, and the
maximum benefit was $6,557.127 The EITC steeply increases with earned
income, and then phases out for higher income earners. To maximize the
2019 EITC, a single parent with one qualifying child 128 would report
earned income of between $10,370 and $19,030.129 A married couple
with three qualifying children receives the maximum 2019 EITC of
$6,557 with earned income between $14,570 and $24,820.130 The child
tax credit is also tied to earned income, providing no benefit at the very
lowest income levels.131
Today, it is possible for a low-income worker to have a lower effective
tax rate with gross income than without it.132 An exclusion from gross
125. How Does the Earned Income Tax Credit Affect Poor Families?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-earned-income-tax-credit-affect-poorfamilies [https://perma.cc/WAR8-DPSF] (last visited Jan. 21, 2021). See also U.S. H.R. COMM. ON
THE BUDGET, DEMOCRAT CAUCUS, 115TH CONG., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT BOOSTS
WORK, REDUCES POVERTY, AND PROVIDES OTHER BENEFITS FOR WORKING AMERICANS 1
(Comm. Print. 2018), https://budget.house.gov/publications/report/earned-income-tax-creditboosts-work-reduces-poverty-and-provides-other-benefits [https://perma.cc/GF8H-CWVX] (citing CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 119).
126. See Federal Returns with EITC, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/federal-returns-eitc [https://perma.cc/XX9J-G77A].
127. Statistics for 2019 Tax Returns with EITC, IRS, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc-central/statistics-for-tax-returns-with-eitc/statistics-for-2019-tax-returns-with-eitc [https://perma.cc/2NUNP8V5] (last visited Feb. 12, 2021); Earned Income and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Tables,
IRS, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/earned-incometax-credit-income-limits-and-maximum-credit-amounts [https://perma.cc/4YMV-REC7] (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).
128. Ms. Reilly is one such taxpayer. A son or daughter who is permanently and totally disabled
may be a qualifying child for the EITC at any age. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(i) (predicating one option
for eligibility for the EITC on having a “qualified child”); § 152(c)(3)(B) (waiving the “qualified
child” age requirements for individuals who are permanently and totally disabled).
129. See Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-earned-income-taxcredit [https://perma.cc/XG4Z-XNNA]. The maximum 2019 EITC for this taxpayer is $3,526. Id.
130. Id. The Feighs are one such family. See infra notes 184–189 and accompanying text.
131. See Maag, supra note 122, at 3 (“Those with earnings under $3,000 cannot get any ACTC,
while others have too little earnings to get the full credit.”). Congress has changed the income
threshold several times, but as of February 2021, it has never been zero. This may change with the
2021 economic stimulus bill. See Jason DeParle, In the Stimulus Bill, a Policy Revolution in Aid
for Children, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/07/us/politics/childtax-credit-stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/658Z-UTQU].
132. See T17-0124—Tax Benefit of the Earned Income Tax Credit, Baseline: Current Law, Distribution of Federal Tax Change by Expanded Cash Income Level, 2017, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr.
18, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/individual-income-tax-expendituresapril-2017/t17-0124-tax-benefit-earned-income-tax [https://perma.cc/N9A3-DAZM].
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income is no longer necessarily a benefit. To the extent § 131’s exclusion
is intended as a benefit or a behavioral incentive, subsequent changes to
the rest of the tax code now undermine that purpose for some taxpayers.
2. The Affordable Care Act Connects the Tax Code to Health Insurance
Eligibility
When considering the changing landscape of social welfare programs
between 1980 and 2020, it is impossible to overstate the importance of
the Affordable Care Act.133 The ACA effected broad changes to national
health care policy, touching every aspect of the health care system from
Medicaid to private employer-sponsored insurance. Its policies are
effected through a range of carrots and sticks under the purview of several
federal agencies.134 Two ACA developments are particularly important
for family caregivers: (1) changes to the Medicaid program and (2) the
creation of Marketplaces for individuals to purchase subsidized health
insurance.
The ACA made two major changes to the Medicaid program, effective
in 2014. First, it created a new eligibility category for poor adults.135 This
is the “Medicaid expansion.” Previously, nondisabled nonelderly adults
without minor children (like Ms. Reilly) were not eligible for Medicaid,
no matter how poor they were.136
The second major change the ACA made to Medicaid was to revise
how financial eligibility is calculated for most children and adults.137 For
133. The fate of the ACA is currently in doubt; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
the individual mandate and with it the entire statute, and the Supreme Court is considering the case
on appeal. See Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020).
134. Samantha Galvin & Christine Speidel, Understanding the Affordable Care Act and Its Impact on Low-Income Taxpayers, in EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS,
29-6 (T. Keith Fogg ed., 7th ed. 2018) (“The ACA includes carrots as well as sticks. Positive incentives for consumers to get coverage include an expansion of the Medicaid program and subsidies
available for insurance plans purchased through the exchanges. Small businesses also have access
to a tax credit for providing insurance to their employees. . . . The implementation of the ACA
requires participation from many different federal agencies, including HHS, the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Department of the Treasury. State insurance departments continue to have a
role as well.”); see also Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics & Politics in the
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 805 (2012).
135. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), § 2001(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
136. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
137. See PPACA § 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14). See also MaryBeth Musumeci, The Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Medicaid Eligibility, Enrollment, and Benefits for People with Disabilities, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 2014), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/839002-the-affordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U7B-SVFJ].
The basic Medicaid financial eligibility framework for individuals with disabilities was unchanged
by the ACA. The new rules do not apply to individuals who qualify for Medicaid based on old age
or disability. See PPACA § 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14).
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the new expansion population, Medicaid financial eligibility is now based
on a person’s adjusted gross income (AGI) under § 62 of the Internal
Revenue Code, with a few modifications. 138 Therefore, gross income
exclusions now directly influence one’s eligibility for health insurance.
Before the ACA, Medicaid had very different income eligibility rules,
which were not aligned with considerations of income for tax
purposes.139 For many categories of eligible individuals, including newly
eligible poor adults, access to Medicaid is now tied to the federal income
tax return in a way that it never was before.
The ACA works a similar effect for middle-income adults. The law
created Health Insurance Marketplaces in each state, which provide a
venue for individuals to purchase private insurance.140 The plans are
subsidized on a sliding scale through two mechanisms: by advance
payments of the premium tax credit,141 and by cost-sharing reductions for
lower-income consumers.142 The premium tax credit benefits individuals
whose income is not low enough to qualify for Medicaid, but who do not
have medical insurance available through an employer.143 As
Marketplace insurance is subsidized through the federal income tax
system, it also uses modified AGI as its measure of financial eligibility.144
Thus, for both very low-income and moderate-income adults, having a
138. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 435.603(e) (2019).
139. See ASPE HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 35 (explaining the concept and rules for countable
income and resources); see generally SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 95, at 5–41.
140. PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031; 45 C.F.R. § 155.20. Statutes and regulations use the
term “exchange,” but in communications with the general public, the government uses the term
“marketplace.” See, e.g., HEALTHCARE.GOV, www.healthcare.gov [https://perma.cc/EF8D-7R6N]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2021); I.R.S. Pub. 974 (Nov. 20, 2019) (discussing the Premium Tax Credit).
The terms are synonymous.
141. PPACA § 1401, I.R.C. § 36B. For an analysis and critique of the Premium Tax Credit, see
Mary Leto Pareja, Inviting Everyone to the ACA (Risk) Pool Party: Using Advanceable, IncomeBased Tax Credits to Subsidize Purchases, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 551 (2017).
142. PPACA § 1402, 42 U.S.C. § 18071. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing Between
Tax and Nontax Delivery Mechanisms for Health Insurance Subsidies, 65 TAX L. REV. 723 (2012).
143. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2). Premium Tax Credits are available to consumers with income up to
400% of the federal poverty line. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A). Note that the ACA refers to the “poverty
line,” but HHS prefers the term “poverty guidelines.” See Frequently Asked Questions Related to
the Poverty Guidelines and Poverty, DHHS: ASPE, http://aspe.hhs.gov/frequently-asked-questions-related-poverty-guidelines-and-poverty [https://perma.cc/EB94-KLSQ] (last visited Feb. 5,
2021). The poverty guidelines are available at HHS Poverty Guidelines for 2021, DHHS: ASPE,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/5G7G-JB2G] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
144. I.R.C. § 36B(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(e)(2) (2020); 42 U.S.C. § 18071. See also
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, THE ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO MAGI 3 (2018), http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/agmagi [https://perma.cc/62QN-LWU6] (“MAGI
has two principal components: income counting and household composition. First, MAGI counts
income according to federal tax law. Second, MAGI rules determine household composition and
family size, with different rules applying in Marketplaces and Medicaid.”). Galvin & Speidel, supra
note 134, at 17.
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low AGI is now a pathway to affordable health insurance.145
For some caregivers, this could be a lifesaving result. Access to
affordable health insurance is more than a perk. For example, having
affordable insurance with low out-of-pocket costs can allow a person with
diabetes to manage their condition and avoid extremely serious health
complications. 146 It is important to note that Medicaid requires much
lower cost-sharing than Marketplace plans do.147 Partially due to the low
costs imposed on participants, it appears the Medicaid expansion “has
improved access to care, utilization of services, the affordability of care,
and financial security among the low-income population.”148 Financially,
145. There is a significant exception to this statement for very low-income adults in the twelve
states that have not yet adopted the Medicaid expansion. In those states, access to health insurance
through Medicaid is not available for adults like Ms. Reilly. Because the ACA presumed that all
states would expand Medicaid coverage, Premium Tax Credit eligibility does not start until one’s
income is at least 100% of the FPL. See I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A). Therefore, a low-income caregiver
in a non-expansion state would prefer to have higher gross income to increase their chance of qualifying for affordable Marketplace coverage.
146. One study found a significant rise in preventative care such as immunizations, blood pressure and cholesterol screenings, and mammograms following the ACA’s implementation, particularly among low-income women. Carol Potera, Women Benefit from the Affordable Care Act, AM.
J. NURSING, July 2019, at 15, 15.
147. See Sherry A. Glied et al., How Medicaid Expansion Affected Out-of-Pocket Health Care
Spending for Low-Income Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/aug/how-medicaid-expansion-affected-outpocket-health-care-spending [https://perma.cc/VB6F-K4JA] (“Medicaid coverage in most states
requires low or no premiums, deductibles, or copayments. In expansion states that have adopted
traditional Medicaid, as well as in most waiver states, premiums and cost-sharing may total to no
more than 5 percent of income.”). See also Sophie Beutel et al., How Much Financial Protection
Do Marketplace Plans Provide in States Not Expanding Medicaid?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (June
16, 2016), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2016/jun/how-much-financial-protection-do-marketplace-plans-provide [https://perma.cc/V3Q4-68ET]; Cost Sharing,
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/cost-sharing/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PNT6-ATXD] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (noting that states can establish limited
cost-sharing requirements for some Medicaid enrollees). In contrast, the Marketplace out-of-pocket
maximum for an individual with 2020 self-only coverage ranged from $8,150 to $2,700, depending
on the individual’s income. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit
and Payment Parameters for 2020, 84 Fed. Reg. 17,454, 17,541–42 (Apr. 25, 2019). This out-ofpocket maximum is in addition to the monthly premium that consumers must pay for a Marketplace
plan. For 2020 marketplace plans, an affordable premium was defined as costing no more than
9.78% of income. Rev. Proc. 2019-29, 2019-32 I.R.B. 620. See also Average Marketplace Premiums by Metal Tier, 2018-2021, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/average-marketplace-premiums-by-metal-tier/ [https://perma.cc/Y2ZW-KXYN] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (tracking average monthly Marketplace premiums across states and tiers).
148. MADELINE GUTH ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE EFFECTS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION
UNDER THE ACA: UPDATED FINDINGS FROM A LITERATURE REVIEW 2 (2020),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/report/the-effects-of-medicaid-expansion-under-the-aca-updatedfindings-from-a-literature-review/ [https://perma.cc/7UFW-3UWG]. See also Dalia Sofer, Low-Income Adults Report Better Health, Other Benefits, with the ACA, AM. J. NURSING, Aug. 2017, at
14, 14; Matthew Buettgens, Fredric Blavin & Clare Pan, The Affordable Care Act Reduced Income
Inequality in the US, HEALTH AFFS. (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00931 [https://perma.cc/SFU8-5WB5].
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a caregiver like Ms. Reilly would be much better off forgoing her $171
EITC 149 in order to qualify for Medicaid through the gross income
exclusion of her caregiving wages.150
C. Attempts to Expand the Difficulty of Care Exclusion to Family
Caregivers
151
Prior to 2014, case law
and IRS guidance152 were uniform in
denying a gross income exclusion to taxpayers caring for their adult
family members with disabilities. The IRS asserted that biological or
adoptive parents could not be “foster” parents or provide “foster care” as
a matter of ordinary meaning, and therefore the plain language of § 131
bars these caregivers from the exclusion.153 In addition, the IRS argued
that self-directed in-home care programs were not “foster care programs”
under § 131.154 In the case of Alexander v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax
Court agreed.155
Mr. and Mrs. Alexander attempted to exclude payments from the
Washington State Medicaid Personal Care program, which they received
as caregivers for Mr. Alexander’s elderly parents, Konstantin and

149. See infra note 197.
150. See also Jennifer Lav, Top 10 Threats to People with Disabilities Under Graham-Cassidy
ACA Repeal Bill, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Sept. 19, 2017), https://healthlaw.org/resource/top10-threats-to-people-with-disabilities-under-the-graham-cassidy-bill
[https://perma.cc/7DSU87U6] (“[T]he home care workers that actually provide HCBS for individuals with disabilities often
rely on Medicaid for their own care. One-in-three home care workers live in households that qualify
for Medicaid expansion. Medicaid expansion indirectly supports individuals with disabilities by
making health care available to their parents and the workers who provide HCBS.”).
151. Case law on § 131 is sparse. There is only one case precisely on point, Alexander v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-48, 2011 WL 1422015 (2011), and there are two Tax Court cases
in which parental caregivers argued unsuccessfully for the general welfare exclusion: Bannon v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 59 (1992) and Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-56 (2011).
See also John C. Zimmerman, Excluding Qualified Foster Care Payments from Income, 93 PRAC.
TAX STRATEGIES 112, 114–15 (2014).
152. See I.R.S. PMTA 2010-07 (Mar. 29, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_201007.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQV6-ADVE]. No final regulations have been promulgated under § 131.
Proposed regulations were published in 1985, but they were soon out of date due to 1986 statutory
amendments and were never finalized. See Exclusion from Gross Income for Certain Foster Care
Payments, 50 Fed. Reg. 4,702, 4,702 (Feb. 1, 1985).
153. PMTA 2020-007, supra note 152.
154. Alexander, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-48, 2011 WL 1422015 at *4. The government generally
took a strict approach to the statutory language prior to 2014. For example, in Micorescu v. Commissioner the government argued, and the Tax Court held, that payments made by a for-profit company contracted by the state to administer its caregiving program did not qualify for the exclusion.
76 T.C.M. (CCH) 796, 802 (1998). Congress subsequently amended § 131 to permit the use of forprofit agencies. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 243 (Comm. Print 2003).
155. Alexander, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-48, 2011 WL 1422015 at *4.
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Tatiana.156 Under this program, Konstantin and Tatiana had chosen to
remain at home, living independently with assistance from their chosen
caregivers, their son and daughter-in-law. Konstantin and Tatiana were
considered the employers of Mr. and Mrs. Alexander under the state
program, although an agency paid the Alexanders with Medicaid
funds.157
The court found this self-directed arrangement inconsistent with a
foster care relationship, and particularly inconsistent with § 131’s
requirement that the care recipient be “placed by . . . an agency” in the
care provider’s home. The Alexander opinion highlights the jarring
contrast between Medicaid’s promotion of independence and selfdirection for adults who need care to live independently, and the entirely
passive foster care framework of § 131.
In early January 2014, one court rejected the IRS’s relationship-based
argument, acknowledging that the plaintiff, a caregiver mother, “could
have let [her son] become a ward of the state when he turned age 18.”158
However, the court then ruled against the mother on the grounds that she
had become her son’s legal guardian, and thus she had a legal duty to
provide for his care under state law.159 Shortly after the government won
this decision, it reversed course with Notice 2014-7.160
1. IRS Notice 2014-7
In early 2014, perhaps not coincidentally around the time the ACA was
being implemented and as Congress was considering the creation of
ABLE accounts,161 the IRS issued subregulatory guidance applying
§ 131’s difficulty of care exclusion to Medicaid’s HCBS waiver program
under section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act.162 In a major
interpretive shift, Notice 2014-7 concludes that parents of adults with
156. Id. at *1.
157. See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text (discussing administration options and Notice 2003-70).
158. Ray v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 2d 760, 768 (S.D. Ohio 2014). The government had
argued that the existence of a blood relationship between mother and son “is what eliminates it
from being a foster care relationship . . . .” Id. at 766.
159. Ray, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
160. As a result, the Rays’ motion to alter or amend the judgment was granted, and they were
awarded a refund of $31,880 in taxes they had paid for 2006 and 2007, plus interest. Ray v. United
States, No. 2:12-cv-677, 2014 WL 12852321 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2014). The record does not
reflect the Rays’ health insurance status, but the reversal would have qualified them for significantly reduced health insurance costs as well, if they did not have access to other insurance.
161. ABLE accounts are tax-advantaged savings accounts held for the benefit of individuals
with disabilities. These accounts may counteract to some extent the impoverishment of people with
disabilities who must qualify for public benefits to receive adequate care. See Hoffer, supra note
28, at 1261 (explaining ABLE accounts and their importance for people with disabilities).
162. I.R.S. Notice 2014-7, 2014-4 I.R.B. 445, 446. The IRS did not seek public comment before
the notice was issued.
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disabilities receiving caregiving payments through HCBS fall within the
difficulty of care exclusion. The IRS further decided that the “home” in
question could be owned by the care recipient, as opposed to solely by
the caregiver.163
The IRS based its decision on the purpose and design of the programs,
reasoning that HCBS serves the same function today as adult foster care
programs did in the early 1980s. 164 The purpose and function of the
program trumped the “foster care” label in the eyes of tax administrators.
This subregulatory guidance raised new possibilities for caregivers to
benefit from the gross income exclusion. Notice 2014-7 was publicized
by health care advocates who saw it as a means for family caregivers to
obtain affordable health care through the ACA. 165 The § 131 income
exclusion meant that caregivers were more likely to qualify for Medicaid
or for lower Marketplace premiums and cost-sharing subsidies.166
Unfortunately for caregivers eager to claim the exclusion, Notice
2014-7 is specific to HCBS waiver programs authorized under section
1915(c) of the SSA.167 The Notice thus left many unanswered questions
for caregivers receiving payments under other Medicaid and state law
programs.168 The complexity of Medicaid was a significant stumbling

163. Id.
164. Id. (“Under state foster care programs, a state . . . may assist in locating a home that meets
the qualified foster individual’s needs, negotiate or approve the foster care payment rates, and contract with the foster care providers for the provision of foster care. . . . States perform similar activities with respect to individuals participating in Medicaid waiver programs. Under a Medicaid
waiver program, a state . . . may assist in locating a home for an eligible individual or approve the
eligible individual’s choice to reside in the individual care provider’s home, approve an eligible
individual’s plan of care, assess the suitability of the home for fulfilling the eligible individual’s
plan of care, and enter into a contract or other arrangement with the individual care provider for
services provided to the eligible individual.”).
165. See, e.g., WAYNE TURNER & MICHELL LILIENFELD, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM,
LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA: HCBS PAYMENTS TO CAREGIVERS AND MAGI (2016),
https://healthlaw.org/resource/lessons-from-ca-hcbs-payments-to-caregivers-and-magi/
[https://perma.cc/KN5D-N6FS]; WAYNE TURNER, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, FACT SHEET:
IRS UPDATED GUIDANCE ON HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES AND EXCLUDING
‘DIFFICULTY OF CARE’ PAYMENTS FROM GROSS INCOME 4 (2016), http://procedurallytaxing.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NHeLP-Factsheet-on-exclusion-of-difficulty-of-care-payments-Final-4.9.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPT-PL7J].
166. The exception, as noted above, is for individuals in non-expansion states whose gross income is under 100% FPL. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
167. Even the term HCBS is not limited to programs under SSA section 1915(c). See, e.g.,
MACPAC LTSS REPORT, supra note 40, at 42 (explaining that after the ACA’s amendments to the
SSA, states can “provide HCBS under the Medicaid state plan without obtaining a waiver under
Section 1915(c)”); id. at 47, 51–52 (listing and describing various Medicaid pathways available to
states to provide long-term services and supports in the community).
168. See Christine Speidel, Information Letter Shows Need for Broader Guidance on Difficulty
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block to uniform implementation of the IRS’s interpretive change. Two
states submitted requests for IRS letter rulings169 and received blessings
to apply the difficulty of care exclusion to their in-home care programs
in addition to their section 1915(c) programs.170 For example, California
requested guidance on four additional programs for in-home supportive
care: three operated under Medicaid plus one solely state-funded
program.171 These requests reflect the legal complexities of our federalist
health care system. In both cases, the IRS applied similar “purpose and
function” analysis as in Notice 2014-7 and concluded that the other
programs similarly qualified for “difficulty of care” treatment under
§ 131.172
Another stumbling block to implementation of Notice 2014-7 was
administrability. There were administration challenges both for states and
their contracted fiscal managers, and for taxpayers.
Because of the enormous variability in home care programs, there are
a variety of caregiver situations and administrative structures.173
of Care Exclusion, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Feb. 21, 2019), https://procedurallytaxing.com/information-letter-shows-need-for-broader-guidance-on-difficulty-of-care-exclusion/
[https://perma.cc/CTK3-AYUK]; Leonardo Castañeda, Murky Rule Generates Expensive Tax Turmoil for California Caregivers, INEWSOURCE (Mar. 28, 2016), https://inewsource.org/2016/03/28/rule-expensive-tax-turmoil-california-caregivers/ [https://perma.cc/3SEUWFAT].
169. See generally Rev. Proc. 2020-1, § 2.01, 2020-1 I.R.B. 1, 8 (“A letter ruling interprets the
tax laws and applies them to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”). A letter ruling is binding on the
IRS only as to the taxpayer who requested it; other taxpayers are not entitled to rely on the analysis.
See id. § 11, 2020-1 I.R.B. at 61–62; I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
170. See, e.g., Difficulty of Care Payments Excludable from Income, supra note 86. The private
letter ruling (PLR) issued to the State of Washington is available in redacted form only from the
IRS. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 131836-15, 7–8 (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/201624012.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUK8-9AAC]. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 127776-15, 8–
10 (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201623003.pdf [https://perma.cc/28HY-PXB7].
171. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 127776-15 at 3. The three Medicaid programs were (1) the Personal
Care Services Program operated under SSA section 1905(a)(24), (2) the In-Home Supportive Services Plus Option operated under SSA section 1915(j), and (3) the Community First Choice Option
program operated under SSA section 1915(k). Id. at 2–3. The other PLR requested guidance on its
programs pursuant to sections 1905 and 1915(k) of the SSA. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 131836-15
at 2.
172. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 127776-15 at 8–11 (“Whether certain payments under [California’s]
in-home supportive care programs will be treated as difficulty of care payments excludable from
gross income of the provider under section 131 of the Code depends on an analysis of the purpose
and design of the programs and the nature of the payments. . . . [T]he purpose and design of all four
of State’s in-home supportive care programs are similar to the purpose and design of foster care
programs, and the nature of the described payments to providers is similar to the nature of difficulty
of care payments under section 131 of the Code. Therefore, payments under all four of State’s inhome supportive care programs to an individual care provider for in-home supportive care provided
for an eligible recipient who resides in the provider’s home will be treated as difficulty of care
payments excludable from the gross income of the provider under section 131.”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 131836-15 at 7–10 (containing identical language as I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 127776-15, supra).
173. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
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Following the issuance of Notice 2014-7, the IRS posted a series of
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on its website as it became clear that
implementation of this change posed difficulties.174 These FAQ reflect
the range of complications that taxpayers were facing. As reflected by the
FAQ, caregivers were being treated in three ways: as employees of the
agency issuing the payments, as employees of the care recipient, or as
independent contractors.175 There was confusion over withholding and
reporting requirements for both income taxes and employment taxes.176
For fiscal management companies, there was another, practical
complication: the capacity of their payroll software. An article
coauthored by a home health agency administrator noted:
Most small business software packages do not have the capability or
flexibility to properly account for wages that are excludable from
income taxes . . . . Payroll systems for larger businesses have the ability
to properly account for wages that are excludable from income taxes,
but for smaller employers these services can be cost prohibitive.177

Perhaps in response to lobbying from these companies, some states
allowed fiscal managers to decide whether the agency would
accommodate a caregiver’s request that their payments not be reported as
taxable income under the difficulty of care exclusion.178 Some states also
allowed fiscal managers to make different choices regarding the
employment status of workers.

174. See IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85.
175. Id. at Q&A 12.
176. Id. at Q&As 16, 18–20.
177. William E. Wilcox et al., Notice 2014-7: Issues for Home Healthcare Agencies, 98 PRAC.
TAX STRATEGIES 193, 196 (2017).
178. Minnesota permits each financial management service (FMS) to decide whether it will
implement Notice 2014-7 or continue reporting “difficulty of care” payments as taxable income.
See E-mail from Minn. CDCS Disability Servs. Div., Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., to Kathryn Sedo
(Oct. 25, 2018) (on file with author). See also Financial Management Services (FMS) Providers,
MINN.
DEP’T
HUM.
SERVS.,
https://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=
GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased&dDocName=DH
S-307069 [https://perma.cc/4QLK-JZLC] (May 13, 2020) (showing DHS delegates its FMS services, which include payroll services, to providers). See, e.g., Is Your Income Exempt from Taxes
As “Difficulty of Care Payments”?, PARTNERS CMTY. SUPPORTS (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.lssmn.org/pics/news/difficulty-of-care [https://perma.cc/VZ76-J92R] (inviting workers who qualify for the exemption to complete and submit an “IRS Notice 2014-7 Certification”
and advising that PICS will “adjust your federal and state income tax withholding to zero for all
future eligible payments”); ACCRA CARE, INC., 245D WAIVERED SERVICES POLICY HANDBOOK
128, https://www.accrahomecare.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/245D-Waivered-Services-Policy-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4AM-RMC8] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (stating regarding
the Notice 2014-7 exemption, “Accra does not pursue this for employees and Accra staff are not
tax professionals.”).
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For example, in Colorado, the Division for Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities oversees the Medicaid waiver program and originally required that caregivers be classified as employees. After the state
became aware of Notice 2014-7, it removed the employee requirement
from the regulations and allowed service agencies to treat caregivers as
independent contractors. Thus, midway through the year, caregivers in
Colorado that were considered employees during the first half of the
year may not have been considered employees for the second half of the
year. More than 300 service agencies were allowed to implement this
policy change independently, so there was no uniform implementation
of the change. Some service agencies continued to classify the caregivers as employees and issued Forms W-2 for their difficulty-of-care payments for the entire year. Other service agencies changed their reporting
procedures and properly did not report the payments as wages or as
Form 1099 expenditures for the last part of the year but issued Forms
W-2 for the first part of the year.179

In the face of these obstacles, the IRS recognized that tax reporting and
withholding for caregiver income would be inconsistent and sometimes
erroneous.180 Rather than wade into the morass of community care
program administration, which would likely step on states’ toes, the IRS
placed the burden instead on each individual caregiver to correctly report
their income and seek a refund of any erroneous withholding.181
2. Feigh v. Commissioner, 2019
To date, one case has challenged IRS Notice 2014-7, Feigh v.
Commissioner.182 Who would want to challenge a tax break for
caregivers of disabled family members? Caregivers who did not view the
gross income exclusion as a break, but rather as a deprivation of benefits.
The conflict arose because of the requirement to show “earned income”
to qualify for cash benefits provided through the tax code, namely the
EITC and the additional child tax credit (ACTC).183
Mary and Edward Feigh have three children, one of whom was under
seventeen years old in 2015.184 Two of the Feighs’ children are adults
179. McClellan & Tripp, supra note 85, at 228.
180. IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85, at Q&As 11–14.
181. Id. (“[Y]ou must first contact the agency that withheld the taxes for a refund. However, if
the agency indicates an intention not to file a claim or adjust the overpaid social security and Medicare taxes, you may claim a refund of the erroneously withheld social security and Medicare taxes
by filing Form 843, Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement.”). This could partly explain why
only two states sought guidance from the IRS regarding their non-1905(c) in-home care programs.
182. 152 T.C. 267 (2019).
183. The “additional child tax credit” is the refundable portion of the child tax credit. Lowincome individuals who owe little if any income tax mainly benefit from the CTC through receiving
the ACTC. Marr et al., EITC & CTC, supra note 124, at 4.
184. The facts presented in this Essay are derived from the U.S. Tax Court’s opinion and from
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with severe disabilities who lived at home that year. Mary earned $7,353
for care provided to her adult children through a Medicaid home care
program.185 The family would have been eligible for SNAP186 benefits
and some cash assistance from their state’s Supplemental Aid
Program. 187 At this income level, Mary and Edward also qualify for
Medicaid.188 Based on Mary’s income from caregiving, the Feighs
claimed an EITC of $3,319, and a refundable ACTC of $653, for a total
refund of $3,972 for 2015.189
The IRS objected and challenged the Feighs’ tax return. Before the Tax
Court, the IRS argued that Medicaid waiver payments for care of the
disabled adult children are not gross income under the rationale of Notice
2014-7, and therefore they cannot be “includible in gross income” for
purposes of the EITC and ACTC.190 For their part, the Feighs argued that
the brief filed by the Feighs. See Petitioners’ Seriatim Answering Brief, Feigh, 152 T.C. 267 (No.
20163-17).
185. Feigh, 152 T.C. at 268.
The record does not reflect what other nontaxable income the Feigh family had. If we suppose that
each of the adult children received disability benefits through Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
in 2015, the family’s household income would rise to about $24,945. SSI provides a subsistence
level of income to individuals with disabilities who have little or no income and assets, and who do
not have enough work credits to qualify for Social Security Disability benefits. The federal SSI
benefit in 2015 was $733 per month, assuming each beneficiary paid their “fair share” of the
family’s living expenses. See SSI Federal Payment Amounts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSIamts.html [https://perma.cc/ V3DB-PSYL] (last visited Feb. 8,
2021) (laying out the monthly SSI payment amounts from 1975 to 2021). To calculate these figures,
$733 × 12 months × 2 adult children = $17,592; $17,592 + $7,353 = $24,945. Note that the term
“household income” is used here in the colloquial sense.
186. SNAP is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, formerly known as food stamps.
See SNAP Eligibility, USDA: FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/recipient/eligibility [https://perma.cc/4D3K-HPS5] (last visited Dec. 30, 2020) (providing a Frequently
Asked Questions resource regarding general program information and eligibility requirements).
187. MINN. STAT. §§ 256D.33–54, 256I.01–06 (2020). This cash benefit is not large. See Minnesota Supplemental Aid (MSA): The Basics, MINN. DISABILITY BENEFITS 101,
https://mn.db101.org/mn/programs/income_support/msa/ [https://perma.cc/R6YU-KSAC] (Feb. 3,
2021) (“A person living alone and getting SSI will usually qualify for a MSA benefit of $81.”);
Minnesota
Supplemental
Aid,
MINN.
DEP’T
HUM.
SERVS.,
https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-1888-ENG [https://perma.cc/EPE5-9FDC] (last
visited Jan. 8, 2021) (noting that the benefit for a single person can be up to $81 per month, for a
couple, up to $111 per month, and for a person living in a facility, up to $74 per month).
188. The SSI payments are not counted as income for purposes of Mary and Edward’s Medicaid
eligibility, because the benefit recipients do not have an income tax filing requirement. However,
Mary and Edward would still be eligible for Medicaid (as they lived in an expansion state) even if
the SSI payments were counted.
189. Feigh, 152 T.C. at 269.
190. The IRS did not argue in the alternative that the Feighs’ gross income should be increased
to include the caregiver payments, likely because the payments were so small that including them
in gross income would have zero tax consequences and therefore would not affect the outcome of
the Tax Court case. The couple’s taxable income will be zero whether the Feighs’ gross income is
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caregiving is work, Mary had earned income in exchange for her services,
and the IRS had no authority to withhold a congressionally granted
benefit for workers simply by issuing a notice.191 The Tax Court sided
with the Feighs.
In its opinion, the Tax Court found that “the plain text of section 131
renders it inapplicable to the care of biological adult children.”192 The
Court gave short shrift to the “oversight and purposes” framework
employed by Notice 2014-7, discounting its reasoning and giving the
notice “little, if any, deference.”193 The Court was appropriately
concerned with the denial of the refundable credits to the petitioners
based solely on a subregulatory notice which lacks the force of law.194
Thus, the Tax Court disregarded Notice 2014-7 and allowed the Feighs’
EITC and ACTC.195
The Feigh case highlights the divergent interests that family caregivers
have depending on their household income. Like Kerrie Reilly, Mary
Feigh cares for her adult disabled children and receives state payments
for this work. However, the Feigh household has a much lower income
than the Reillys’. For the Feighs, losing the refundable EITC by
excluding Medicaid waiver payments from income would be devastating.
The Feighs’ income is so low that they see zero income tax savings from
zero or $7,353; the outcome of the case hinged solely on whether the Feighs had qualifying “earned
income” for the refundable credits. If there is a distinction to be drawn between “earned income”
for refundable credits and “gross income” contributing to AGI and then taxable income, the Court
did not reach it.
191. Petitioners’ Seriatim Answering Brief, supra note 184, at 15–17. See also Caleb Smith,
Invalidating an IRS Notice: Lessons and What’s to Come from Feigh v. C.I.R., PROCEDURALLY
TAXING (June 17, 2019), https://procedurallytaxing.com/invalidating-an-irs-notice-lessons-andwhats-to-come-from-feigh-v-c-i-r/ [https://perma.cc/E2ZS-29ZX]. In their brief, the Feighs also
argued that the court should understand the earned income requirement in § 32 broadly, to encompass payments for services that are not gross income. Petitioners’ Seriatim Answering Brief, supra
note 184, at 16–17. The court appears to reject that argument, but technically it did not reach the
question because, as noted above, the IRS did not argue that the payments should be included in
gross income if the government lost the difficulty of care issue.
192. Feigh, 152 T.C. at 272.
193. Id. at 275.
194. Subregulatory guidance increases predictability, but its exemption from procedural rulemaking requirements is problematic under both administrative law principles and taxpayer rights
grounds. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker & Rebecca Turnbull, Operationalizing Internal Administrative Law, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1225, 1227–28, 1241–43 (2020) (identifying benefits and costs of
subregulatory guidance and suggesting that agencies “should avoid injecting guidance with binding
intent”); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 242 (2009) (“[IRS] guidance falls directly into a large doctrinal void of
what it means for a rule to carry the force of law”); Leslie Book, Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat at
the Table, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 759 (2019) (proposing, inter alia, a requirement for pre-publication
input by the National Taxpayer Advocate on the impact of subregulatory guidance on taxpayer
rights). See also Smith, supra note 191 (“[T]he IRS can’t magically decree that what was once
earned income is no more through the issuance of subregulatory guidance.”).
195. Feigh, 152 T.C. at 276.
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a gross income exclusion, and they qualify for Medicaid already. On the
other side of the equation, the EITC and ACTC are a large percentage of
the Feighs’ annual income, providing crucial financial support for the
household. The Feighs may have alleviated a serious financial hardship
by reporting their difficulty of care payments as earned income to claim
the EITC and ACTC.
In contrast, Ms. Reilly’s $40,000 caregiving wage 196 (without the
application of § 131) only qualifies her for a very small EITC (about
$171),197 and she does not have a qualifying child for the child tax credit.
If her caregiving wages are included in gross income, she could receive
subsidized private health insurance through California’s Health Insurance
Marketplace, Covered California, thanks to the Affordable Care Act.198
However, if Ms. Reilly’s caregiving wages are excluded, she qualifies for
the much more generous Medi-Cal program, 199 greatly reducing her
health insurance and out of pocket healthcare costs.200
As the comparison between the Reillys and the Feighs illustrates, some
families are better off with the § 131 exclusion and may even gain access
to affordable health insurance and health care, but others lose crucial
economic supports. Quantifying the benefits of one option versus the
196. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
197. See Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 129 (showing that, in 2019,
for a single filer with one child and $40,000 in household earnings, the EITC would be about $171).
198. See Section II.B.2, supra. With a family size of two, Ms. Reilly’s household income is
around 232% of the federal poverty line, making her eligible for a Premium Tax Credit and reduced
cost-sharing. See generally Galvin & Speidel, supra note 134; Pareja, supra note 141.
199. See Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits for Adults as a Percent of the Federal Poverty
Level, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-incomeeligibility-limits-for-adults-as-a-percent-of-the-federal-poverty-level/
[https://perma.cc/D99RCAUQ] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021) (showing that California sets its eligibility limit at 138% FPL).
200. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. Ms. Reilly would pay a monthly premium of about $150 through Covered California. Medi-Cal Eligibility & Covered California—
FAQ’s, CA.GOV: DEP’T HEALTH CARE SERVS., https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Pages/Medi-CalFAQs2014a.aspx [https://perma.cc/N5K5-Z2J3] (Nov. 19, 2019); Shop and
Compare,
COVERED
CAL.,
https://apply.coveredca.com/lw-shopandcompare/
[https://perma.cc/V7YG-J9R4] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021) (information entered for a forty-fiveyear-old individual for 2021, living in Marin County, California (zip code 94901), with $40,000
income needing medium use coverage). In addition to her premiums, Ms. Reilly would also be
responsible for co-pays and cost-sharing when she used her insurance. These costs can add up, even
for individuals with federal cost-sharing subsidies. For example, a Vermont resident with the same
cost-sharing subsidy level as Ms. Reilly who has type 2 diabetes would pay about $1,400 per year
in cost-sharing, in addition to their premium. Summary of Benefits and Coverage: BCBSVT Silver
Plan,
BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD
VT.,
at
7,
https://info.healthconnect.vermont.gov/sites/hcexchange/files/2017_
SBCs/Silver%20Standard%2087%25%20AV.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TXG-KAUC] (last visited Feb. 6, 2021). (Such estimates are not readily available for California plans.) In contrast, Medi-Cal premiums are minimal (between $0 and $39 per
month), and so is cost-sharing. Medi-Cal Eligibility & Covered California—FAQ’s, supra, at Question 2.
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other is relatively simple when one only considers the Form 1040.
However, the fact that access to affordable health care is now tied to AGI
complicates the equation. The Feighs got their much-needed EITC, but
did Kerrie Reilly lose her Medicaid?201
3. The IRS Responds to Feigh
After the Feigh opinion, the IRS appeared to reach an uneasy
compromise. In the spring of 2020, it advised volunteer income tax
assistance (VITA) programs that taxpayers are permitted to choose how
they treat Medicaid waiver payments for income tax purposes:
A taxpayer may choose to include qualified Medicaid waiver payments
in the calculation of earned income for the EIC and the ACTC. The
taxpayer may include qualified Medicaid waiver payments in earned
income even if the taxpayer chooses to exclude those payments from
gross income.202

Around the same time, the IRS published an ambiguous Action on
Decision (AOD) notice. This notice appears to accept the Feighs’
argument that payments can be both earned income for EITC and ACTC
purposes and excluded from gross income under § 131.203 However, at
the same time the AOD calls into question the agency’s continued
commitment to Notice 2014-7. The AOD acquiesces in the result of the
Feigh case, including that “Medicaid waiver payments received as wages
for the care of the taxpayer[s’] disabled adult children in their own home
are not excludable from income under I.R.C. 131 . . . .”204
Since then, the IRS has maintained this contradictory and limited
position.205 The IRS still uses the term “Medicaid waiver payments” and
201. The impact of this obviously depends greatly on Ms. Reilly’s healthcare needs.
202. I.R.S. Volunteer Tax Alert, VTA-2020-03 (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/vta-2020-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK3X-232K].
203. Feigh v. Comm’r, 152 T.C. 267 (2019), action on dec., 2020-02 (Mar. 30, 2020). This
position is quite taxpayer-friendly, but it is curiously so, as the Tax Court did not adopt the petitioners’ interpretation of “includible in gross income” in § 32. See supra notes 192–193 and accompanying text.
204. Feigh, 152 T.C. 267 (2019), action on dec., 2020-02 (Mar. 30, 2020).
205. See I.R.S. Pub. 4012, No. 34183E, at D-59 (Oct. 2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p4012.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6GS-CQWF]; I.R.S. 2020 Form 1040 Instructions, No. 24811V,
at 87, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf [https://perma.cc/63PC-KXEM] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2021); IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85. The IRS has not published any guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin aside from the AOD. IRS publications, website FAQ, and form instructions
do not bind the agency and may not be relied upon by taxpayers. Reed v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo
2014-41, 2014 WL 926908, at *3 (T.C. Mar. 10, 2014) (“Further, informal guidance, such as the
FAQs posted to the IRS' Web site, is not an authoritative source of Federal tax law.”); see also
Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 195 (2000) (“Administrative guidance contained in IRS publications is not binding on the Government, nor can it change the plain meaning of tax statutes.”); Adler
v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1964) (“Nor can any interpretation by taxpayers of the language used in government pamphlets act as an estoppel against the government, nor change the
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refers to SSA section 1915(c) in discussing § 131, even though it
concluded in two letter rulings that other Medicaid and non-Medicaid
caregiving programs can qualify for the difficulty of care exclusion.206
To the extent that tax preparers, Medicaid agencies, and caregivers are
relying on IRS statements to determine their options, 207 the current
guidance is likely to result in underclaiming of the exclusion.208
Where does all this leave caregivers? The legal disputes have centered
on the relationship between caregiver and care recipient,209 but also on
whether the structure of modern caregiving support programs fits within
§ 131.210 These issues remain unresolved. Worse, the administrative
complications that were brought to light as family caregivers pushed for
the implementation of Notice 2014-7 have only grown with the IRS’s
current flexibility.211
For now, savvy and risk-tolerant taxpayers or their tax preparers will
be able to maximize their tax and health care benefits. Ms. Reilly can
exclude her waiver payments to get more affordable health care, thanks
to a lower modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). The Feighs, on the
other hand, can include their waiver payments to benefit from the EITC
meaning of taxing statutes.”). These are less formal means of communicating to taxpayers than the
IRS used in Notice 2014-7. The IRS’s use of nonbinding and informal statements implicates some
of the same fairness, informed decision-making, and democratic legitimacy concerns that Professor
Kristin Hickman has identified in the regulatory context. See Kristin Hickman, Coloring Outside
the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728, 1805 (2007) [hereinafter Hickman,
Coloring Outside the Lines].
206. IRS § 131 FAQ, supra note 85.
207. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 205, at 1805 (“[M]ost taxpayers are
inclined to adhere even to informal IRS interpretations of the law rather than risk an enforcement
action.”).
208. This is particularly true for caregivers of adults with serious mental illnesses, because SSA
section 1915(c) waiver programs generally do not cover their care. See ASPE HANDBOOK supra
note 24, at 13, 53.
209. See, e.g., Feigh, 152 T.C. at 271–72; In re Hite, 557 B.R. 451, 458 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2016)
(examining whether caregiver-parents who lived with and cared for their disabled son were “qualified foster care providers”); Ray v. United States, 993 F. Supp. 2d 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
(finding that the mother-son relationship was not a foster care relationship and thus payments were
not excludable).
210. See Alexander v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-48, 2011 WL 1422015, at *1 (2011); In
re Hite, 557 B.R. at 460 (discussing the IRS’s expansion of the definition of “foster care provider”
in Notice 2014-7); Micorescu v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 796, 802 (1998) (finding that payments
made by a for-profit company contracted by the state to administer its caregiving program do not
qualify for the § 131 exclusion).
211. See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text. See also ROBERT L. MOLLICA ET AL.,
AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., BUILDING ADULT FOSTER CARE: WHAT STATES CAN DO 23–28 (2009),
https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/2009_13_building_adult_foster_care.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M65G-P3AN] (noting that foster care providers do not understand § 131 exclusion and providing examples of state programs and funding models).
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and ACTC, and still have MAGI low enough to qualify for Medicaid.
Unfortunately, caregivers without the necessary information or counsel
will likely follow the path laid out by the state agency or fiscal manager,
reporting wages if they received a W-2, and forgoing the EITC if they did
not receive a W-2.212 To do otherwise risks a frozen refund and a letter
from the IRS.213
III. TOWARD A COHESIVE FEDERAL CAREGIVING POLICY
The difficulties encountered by taxpayers and the IRS in trying to adapt
the now outdated difficulty of care exclusion to current health care
realities can spur a fresh look at tax supports for caregiving. This Part
evaluates what current law lacks in light of the health and disability policy
motivations underlying community care and the § 131 exclusion. It then
closes with suggestions for new approaches that allow better achievement
of these goals.
A. The Difficulty of Care Exclusion Illuminates Substantive Frictions
and Procedural Shortcomings
The tale of the difficulty of care exclusion shows the need for better
coordination between tax policy and health care policy for family
caregivers. Lawmakers can draw three main lessons from the difficulty
of care story. First, a gross income exclusion is no longer a simple way
to enact a policy preference,214 because of its interaction with the EITC
212. Of course, caregivers claiming the EITC without a W-2 (or otherwise taking a position
conflicting with the state or FMS’s reporting) will be subject to IRS compliance scrutiny. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-224, TAX FRAUD AND NONCOMPLIANCE: IRS CAN
STRENGTHEN PRE-REFUND VERIFICATION AND EXPLORE MORE USES 6–8 (2018) [hereinafter
GAO, TAX FRAUD AND NONCOMPLIANCE] https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689702.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YJ7-VGFL] (detailing role of W-2 in EITC refund hold and audit procedures).
The IRS has attempted to address documentation issues related to Medicaid waiver payments
through its VITA instructions, but not all low-income taxpayers use VITA services, and the IRS
publications referenced in Form 1040 instructions are not as clear as the alert issued to VITA volunteers. See I.R.S. 2020 Forms 1040 and 1040-SR Instructions, supra note 205, at 23 (referring
readers to additional pages and publications); contra VTA-2020-03, supra note 202 (explaining
different scenarios and how to enter information into tax software used by volunteers). See also
I.R.S. Pub. 4012, supra note 205, at D-6, D-59 (providing detailed instructions to VITA volunteers
for how to enter payment information).
213. The IRS often “freezes” the refundable credits if a tax return claiming the EITC or ACTC
is selected for review, paying out the refund only if the taxpayer prevails. GAO, TAX FRAUD AND
NONCOMPLIANCE, supra note 212, at 20–21; NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2 OBJECTIVES REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
87–88
(2018),
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/JRC18_Volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U32-ZKD6]; see also Leslie Book et al.,
Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Improve Administration of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV.
177, 205 (2018) (“[M]ost EITC audits are done before the refund is released . . . .”) (citing
CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 119, at 10).
214. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
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and ACTC. Second, a gross income exclusion is not necessarily simple
to implement. In the home care context, it is anything but simple to
overlay a targeted gross income exclusion on the multitude of Medicaid
and state-funded home care programs across the country.215 Even if
federal policy is uniform and the IRS takes steps through forms and
instructions to inform individuals how to claim the benefit of an
exclusion, there will be inconsistent access to benefits if the burden is on
the beneficiary to assert them, rather than on the state agencies and their
agents to correctly report to the IRS. Third, there is a disconnect between
the language and function of the tax system and the values of dignity and
autonomy for care recipients adopted in participant-directed care
programs.
We can also identify lessons for agency administrators. When a tax
provision touches another area of law, particularly a complex area such
as health care, it is especially important to solicit stakeholder input on the
application and administration of that provision. The difficulty of care
exclusion also highlights the divergent interests that taxpayers with
different characteristics may have from each other and from other
stakeholders. An interpretive position that was beneficial to middleincome taxpayers had very harmful effects on very low-income
taxpayers. This suggests that the agency would benefit from soliciting a
wide range of public comments, including from the perspective of
marginalized taxpayers.
In evaluating caregiving supports in light of these points, it is useful to
examine the policy considerations that drove the relevant laws.
Traditionally, tax policy has been viewed through the prisms of
efficiency, equity, and administrability.216 However, this framework has

113 YALE L.J. 955, 980 (“An exclusion is an incredibly simple method of implementing policy . . . .”).
215. Professors Abbe Gluck and Nicole Huberfeld recently demonstrated the complex and arguably incoherent ways that “federalist” aims of state autonomy interact with federal health policy.
Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1689 (2018); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, The New Health Care Federalism on
the Ground, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1 (2018); Hoffer, supra note 28, at 1305.
216. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (calling these three principles “the traditional grounds for evaluating tax policy”); Anthony C. Infanti,
Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (2008) (referring to the three principles as “the triad of
tax policy concerns”). In addition to these criteria, one might also examine the possibility that a
gross income exclusion is appropriate in recognition of the fact that a caregiver realizes no accession to wealth by virtue of their caregiving activities. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 431 (1955). See also Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The General Welfare Exclusion, 169 TAX
NOTES FED. 441, 441–42 (2020) (“The best income tax policy justification for the [general welfare
gross income exclusion] is that the payees may not have enjoyed a net gain in wealth.”). Unfortu-
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been critiqued by scholars, who argue, among other things, that
traditional tax policy analyses, including considerations of equity, reduce
all concerns to economic factors and prevent real consideration of the
lived experiences of marginalized individuals.217 In the disability
context, this is an apt criticism. This scholarly critique also has particular
force when applied to tax provisions whose primary purpose is not
connected with revenue collection but rather seek to advance social goals.
The difficulty of care exclusion is founded in and intertwined with nontax
policy.
What are the social goals and values that we should care about in the
caregiving context? Here, tax must largely defer to health and disability
policy.218 Fighting poverty among individuals with disabilities and their
families is one oft-cited goal of health and disability legislation, including
the ADA.219 Also, there is broad national consensus on the importance of
honoring the dignity and autonomy of people with disabilities and
providing maximum opportunities for individuals to participate fully in
community and economic life.220 Indeed, for disability advocates this is
nately, as programs are currently structured, family caregivers must acknowledge that they are being compensated for providing services. It is firmly established in our tax law that “[w]here the
payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit
from it.” Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Robertson v. United States,
343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)). In fact, tax policy traditionalists would point out that caregivers are
undertaxed to the extent that they are unpaid or underpaid, and thus benefit from imputed income.
See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1577 (1996) (noting that scholars such
as Richard Posner and A.C. Pigou have commented that an ideal income tax would tax nonmarket
activities such as childcare).
217. Infanti, supra note 216, at 1201–02 (“[T]his is a powerful rhetorical move that simultaneously sanitizes the debate over tax fairness—cleansing it of uncomfortable discussions of racism,
sexism, heterosexism, and disability discrimination—and allows that debate to be easily manipulated in favor of those with wealth and power.”). See also Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational
Actors, and Other Myths, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 298 (2009) (“[T]ax policy is a largely mythical
concept, more akin to the Holy Grail than to anything else.”); James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135, 136–38, 145–46 (2012) (describing the persistence
of horizontal and vertical equity analysis despite repeated scholarly criticism).
218. It is not an easy task to divine a coherent set of goals and values from federal health and
disability law, and different players in the system may have differing values. See Bagenstos, ADA
as Welfare Reform, supra note 55, at 926–27 (arguing that the “basis premise” of the ADA can be
seen as welfare reform rather than as a commitment to the social and civil rights of individuals with
disabilities).
219. Weber, Disability Rights, supra note 55, at 2485 (“Supporters [of the ADA] also argued
that by eliminating barriers to employment, it would reduce poverty among people who are disabled
and diminish the need for governmental support.”). Similarly, the goal of the ACA was “to increase
the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.” Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012).
220. See, e.g., Disability Inclusion, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/disability-inclusion.html
[https://perma.cc/54AR-QSMT] (last visited Sept. 22, 2020); supra notes 58–70 and accompanying
text. There is international consensus as well. For example, in 2006, the United Nations adopted
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the minimum, not the ultimate goal.221 Professor Mark Weber explains
that “[t]he conceptual premise of the disability rights movement is the
social model of disability, that is, the recognition that physical and mental
conditions do not themselves disable, but disability results instead from
the dynamic between those conditions and environmental and attitudinal
barriers.”222
However, pure cost-benefit analysis is also a realistic motivation for
governmental support of community caregiving. The origins of § 131
reflect concerns of social welfare (ensuring that foster children with
disabilities find good homes) but also concerns of government efficiency
(saving states the cost of institutional care).223 There is evidence that inhome supports can help people with disabilities maintain a higher level
of functioning and postpone or avoid the need for more expensive care.224
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which aims to “promote, protect and
ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons
with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.” Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 1, https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN6A-CNDE].
Despite this clear policy shift, discussed supra notes 58–71, it has been difficult to transform the
stated goals of participant control into reality. Programs that are participant-centered on paper do
not always cede actual control and autonomy to individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., Ogg, supra
note 17, at 1049; Lisa I. Iezzoni, A Backstory to Michael Ogg’s Narrative Matters Essay: Why He
Needed to Leave PACE, HEALTH AFFS. (July 18, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190717.505863/full/ [https://perma.cc/6VHY-YFVT]. See also Class
Action Complaint at 1–3, Price v. Comm’r, No. 1:21-cv-00025 (D. N.H. Jan. 11, 2021) (alleging
that the State of New Hampshire failed to adequately support its program for community services
and supports, endangering plaintiffs’ choice of community integration). However, these Medicaid
programs are at least “talking the talk” and they have increased community services significantly
compared to the pre-Olmstead days. See also Hoffer, supra note 28, at 1277–78 (noting that Medicaid services are only available to the very poor).
221. See, e.g., Francine J. Lipman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 410–13 (2003) (describing
post-integrationism); Hoffer, supra note 28, at 1268 (explaining that integration via antidiscrimination laws is insufficient to mitigate structural barriers and provide full emancipation for people
with disabilities).
222. Weber, Disability Rights, supra note 55, at 2484 (citing Paula E. Berg, Ill/legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (1999)).
223. See 128 Cong. Rec. S26905 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). This
duality mirrors that reflected in the ADA. See also Bagenstos, ADA as Welfare Reform, supra note
55, at 926–27 (“[S]upporters of the proposed ADA argued that . . . a regime of ‘reasonable accommodations’ could move people with disabilities off of the public assistance rolls and into the workforce in a way that would ultimately save the nation money.”). It is interesting to note that Notice
2014-7 also mentions institutionalization, but the text of § 131 does not actually require an institutional level of need.
224 . See Deinstitutionalization Toolkit: Costs in Detail, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY
(2012), https://ncd.gov/publications/2012/ditoolkit/costs/indetail/ [https://perma.cc/2KKL-ET4E]
(listing case studies that have examined varied reasons for cost savings); AARP, LTSS ACCESS,
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Even the “double benefit” of gross income exclusion and the EITC may
be warranted on this ground when one considers the enormous expenses
of long-term care.225
This cost-benefit justification for § 131 is concerning from the
caregiver’s perspective. Taken too far, it could lead to the exploitation
and impoverishment of family caregivers, especially those who cannot
afford to supplement family caregiving with paid professional services.226
There is a widespread recognition and expectation that caregivers who
live with the care recipient will likely provide significant uncompensated
care, especially if the caregiver is caring for a loved one.227 Caregivers

supra note 27, at 14 (“In the long run, providing HCBS in lieu of nursing home care may be a more
cost-effective approach to financing LTSS for the state.”) (citing H. Stephen Kaye et al., Do Noninstitutional Long-Term Care Services Reduce Medicaid Spending?, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 262
(2009)); see also Deinstitutionalization: Unfinished Business (Companion Paper to Policy Toolkit),
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Sept. 19, 2012), https://ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sept192012
[https://perma.cc/RBR8-NDVN]. Also, some have suggested that health and social outcomes are
better for people who are at home in a loved one’s care.
225 . AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., VALUING THE INVALUABLE: 2019 UPDATE 1 (2019),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2019/11/valuing-the-invaluable-2019-update-charting-a-path-forward.doi.10.26419-2Fppi.00082.001.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC8R-MTBG] (“In 2017,
about 41 million family caregivers in the United States provided an estimated 34 billion hours of
care to an adult with limitations in daily activities. The estimated economic value of their unpaid
contributions was approximately $470 billion.”). Long-term services and supports “users accounted
for 5.9 percent of Medicaid enrollees but 41.9 percent of all Medicaid spending” in federal fiscal
year 2013. See MACPAC MACSTATS, supra note 29, at 38. The Commission on Long-Term Care
similarly found that “[a] small percentage of Medicaid enrollees (6.4 percent) use LTSS, although
this group (half aged and half disabled) account for nearly half (45.4 percent) of total Medicaid
spending (counting both medical and LTSS expenses).” COMM’N ON LONG-TERM CARE, 2013
REPORT, supra note 8, at 31.
226. See Kaplan, Family Caregiving, supra note 16, at 633 (“Our collective failure to include
in-home healthcare as a key component of our system’s provision of long-term care results in family caregivers facing substantially diminished financial well-being—and in many cases, impoverishment—when their caregiving responsibilities end.”).
227. See Courtney Roman et al., Strengthening Family Caregiving Policies and Programs
Through State Collaboration, HEALTH AFFS. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201112.860149/full/ [https://perma.cc/JDB3-E5VV] (“Family caregiving is worth an estimated $470 billion annually, providing substantial savings to the health care
system.”); James & Hughes, supra note 54 (“According to the Institute of Medicine, there are
somewhere between 29 and 52 million unpaid caregivers nationally.”). Even where government
programs compensate caregivers, statutory caps can effectively require significant unpaid caregiving hours. See, e.g., Reilly v. Marin Hous. Auth., 472 P.3d 472, 485 (Cal. 2020) (“However, an
IHSS provider is limited to a statutory cap of 283 hours of compensation. (§§ 12303.4, 14132.95,
subd.(g).) The discrepancy between a parent provider's actual hours of service and compensation
belies any assertion that IHSS payments, at least with respect to protective supervision, are intended
to represent wages the parent would have earned outside the home, where compensation would be
based on every hour worked.”); COMM’N ON LONG-TERM CARE, 2013 REPORT, supra note 8, at
118 (“Family caregivers, including relatives, friends, partners and neighbors, are the backbone of
long-term services and supports in this country—they provided an estimated $450 billion in unpaid
contributions in 2009—more than total Medicaid spending that year.”).
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are more likely to be female, 228 so the exclusion may perpetuate the
gender pay gap as women forgo outside employment or educational
opportunities to care for family members.229 The cost-benefit
justification may be compelling to Congress, but it can easily become
problematic.
Finally, the language of the law also matters as a mechanism for
communicating values.230 The current “foster care” framework
disempowers and infantilizes care recipients. It assumes that ownership
and control belong to the care provider and to the state program funding
the care.231 As the Tax Court recognized, the framework of “foster care”
is incompatible with participant-directed care, in which the care recipient
has the ability to choose their caregiver, and where the care recipient may
be the common law employer of the caregiver.232 The “difficulty of care”
exclusion in its very name centers the experience of the caregiver and
reminds us of the “burdens” imposed by the individual receiving services.

228. See AARP FAM. CAREGIVING, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 2020, at 10 (2020),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2020/05/full-report-caregiving-in-the-unitedstates.doi.10.26419-2Fppi.00103.001.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RJ9-ZVYH] (reporting that 61% of
caregivers are female).
229. See Shurtz, supra note 18 (arguing that long-term care is a women’s issue and a class
issue).
230. See Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301,
305 (2017) (“[T]he law not only shapes behavior via penalties and rewards, it also serves to express
societal values and approval of (possibly contested) social norms in a way that is valued by citizens
and policymakers independent of the instrumental function of the law.”); Alice G. Abreu & Richard
K. Greenstein, Rebranding Tax/Increasing Diversity, 96 DENV. L. REV. 1, 39 (2018) (arguing that
framing tax law language as focused on raising revenue necessarily places issues of social justice
outside of the field). See also Lydia X.Z. Brown, The Significance of Semantics: Person-First Language: Why It Matters, AUTISTIC HOYA (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.autistichoya.com/2011/08/significance-of-semantics-person-first.html [https://perma.cc/SK6A-AX68].
231. In this way, the language of § 131 encourages dignitary harms such as those experienced
by people who are the supposed principals in a principal-agent relationship with their fiscal manager, yet who have no power to change how payments to the caregiver they hired are reported to
the IRS. See supra notes 90–94 and 178–179 and accompanying text. See also Hoffer, supra note
28, at 1307–08 (exploring concerns of dignitary harms related to ABLE accounts).
232. See, e.g., Alexander v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-48, 2011 WL 1422015, at *4
(2011). See also NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 76 (2001) (proposing legislative changes to simplify the tax code for “family status issues,” including a proposal
to create a uniform definition of a “qualifying child”). A major challenge for current § 131 is to
recognize the diverse abilities of individuals with disabilities. Caregiving programs certainly help
people like K.R. whose intellectual development is very limited. It may seem strange to some that
we would speak of advancing her autonomy. But the same program may also help someone whose
disabilities are purely physical, and who, like Mr. Alexander’s parents, exercise the choice to live
independently rather than in an institution.
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This is antithetical to the social model of disability and perpetuates
disability stigma.233
B. Updating the “Difficulty of Care” Exclusion
There are both social policy and economic cost-benefit justifications
for supporting community-based services and supports for adults with
disabilities, including family caregiving. However, the current § 131
exclusion is an ineffective mechanism for advancing any of these
motivating goals. Tax provisions supporting community caregiving could
more effectively advance the social policies and fiscal concerns that
motivate them if they were designed to better reflect the values of dignity
and autonomy for people with disabilities, and if they were reconciled
with other expenditures targeted at low-income households.
To this end, five preliminary suggestions emerge from our “difficulty
of care” example. First, a caregiving tax break can recognize and
empower the care recipient’s choice of living arrangement and care
provider by applying equally to related and unrelated caregivers. Second,
any caregiving support provisions should be available to individuals
enrolled in participant-directed programs who choose their home and
their caregivers. Third, a caregiving tax break should not make lowerincome families worse off in absolute terms. 234 Fourth, a caregiving
program that piggybacks on state-controlled programs should be flexible
enough to adapt to innovations in program design, to maximize
consistency between residents of different states and the ability of the tax
system to keep up with changes in health policy. Fifth, the provision
should be administrable to minimize dignitary harm and allow
beneficiary families to maximize their personal welfare.
Whatever the structure of a tax expenditure for caregiving, Congress
might avoid the policy conflict shown in Feigh by de-coupling the EITC
and ACTC from the requirement to have earned (taxable) income. Other
eligibility provisions could target those credits at needy taxpayers.235
It is not obvious that financial supports for caregiving should be run
233. See Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 464 (2015) (identifying “the root of the disability stigma” in “the cognitive-affective associations of disability with
incapacity and inhumanity”).
234. For example, by depriving them of the EITC. Though the legislative purposes of the EITC
are complicated, the credit has a strong antipoverty effect. See supra note 125 and accompanying
text; Michael B. Adamson, Note, Earned Income Tax Credit: Path Dependence and the Blessing
of Undertheorization, 65 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1443–44 (2016) (noting that the EITC has “become the
country’s most significant federally administered anti-poverty program” and that “[l]argely due to
the enactment and growth of the EITC, the IRS has become one of the government’s principal
welfare agencies” (citations omitted)).
235. For example, the EITC is not available to those with substantial income from investments.
See I.R.C. § 32(i).
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through the tax code.236 However, congressional appetite for tax
expenditures continues unabated, and it is significantly more common for
legislators to adopt technical fixes to problems than to align broad
priorities or fix fundamental inconsistencies in national policy. So, it is
worth considering improvements to § 131.
To provide nationwide clarity on eligibility, a statutory revision should
recognize the diversity of today’s in-home community care programs.
The receipt of funds through a state-sponsored program with a similar
purpose as either HCBS programs or foster care could replace the current
technical requirements for a foster care placement. Essentially, this
proposal would adopt the IRS’s “purpose and design” approach to
provide future flexibility given the underlying variation in state programs.
Another laudatory aspect of Notice 2014-7 is its embrace of
participant-centered programs. Congress should codify the IRS’s
conclusion that it does not matter whether the care recipient or the
provider owns the home in which they reside, or whether the provider and
care recipient are related. These changes would recognize the agency and
dignity that participant-centered care programs aim to enable. Finally, as
long as refundable credits remain tied to earned income, any reform of
§ 131 should permit individual caregivers to elect the tax treatment they
prefer, maximizing the antipoverty effects of the EITC.
This narrow fix admittedly fails to touch some troubling aspects of
state programs, including administrative complications, horizontal
inequities,237 and dignitary harms. While it is administratively
complicated and potentially inequitable to rely on state programs or their
contractors to determine which payments qualify for the difficulty of care
exclusion under § 131, moving these determinations to the IRS would
likely be even worse. The IRS has not embraced its de facto role as a
benefits administrator, and requiring it to handle greater complexity in
the eligibility or compliance aspects of administering a caregiving credit

236. For example, Professor Stephanie Hoffer has argued that expanding financial eligibility
for habilitative Medicaid services is a normatively superior option. See Hoffer, supra note 28.
237. Perhaps the most troubling feature of caregiving programs from a horizontal equity perspective is states’ and fiscal managers’ disparate treatment of caregivers’ employment status. See
supra notes 85–88, 178, and accompanying text. Disparities in caregiver treatment are even greater
when one broadens the picture to compare Medicaid-funded caregivers with those supported by the
Veterans Benefits Administration. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Disabled Kids and Their Moms:
Caregivers and Horizontal Equity, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43, 46–47 (2012) (noting
that the lack of public benefits available to children with disabilities and their co-resident caregivers
results in “unjustifiable differences in the standards of living among caregivers”). Many points
illuminated by this Essay could be explored through a horizontal equity lens. See generally Ira K.
Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 79
(2016).
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does not fit well with the IRS’s capabilities.238 Complexities in our health
care system will not be solved by adding complexities to our tax system.
There is one context in which Congress has addressed the problem of
an existing gross income exclusion unintentionally harming low-income
beneficiaries by denying them access to refundable credits. In 2004, the
General Accounting Office reported that the gross income exclusion for
combat pay under § 112 was making lower income servicemembers
worse off by denying them the EITC. 239 As a result, in the Working
Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Congress amended §§ 24 and 32 to
allow servicemembers with combat zone income to opt into taxation in
order to receive refundable credits that require earned income. 240 The
legislative history of this amendment indicates that before 2004,
Congress was not attuned to the tension between the gross income
exclusion in § 112 and the refundable credits.241 As with § 131, a wellmeaning gross income exclusion became outdated and harmful to its
intended beneficiaries due to the evolution of the national welfare system
into the tax code. Here, Congress harmonized the tax provisions’ benefits
by creating an election.
To improve the administration of the EITC for servicemembers,
Congress also required nontaxable combat pay to be reported on Form
W-2.242 Consistent and complete third-party reporting improves
taxpayers’ access to benefits by concisely informing them and their tax
preparers of the relevant facts. 243 Improved third-party reporting also
238. The National Taxpayer Advocate has repeatedly pressed this issue. See, e.g., 3 NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOC., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: MAKING
THE EITC WORK FOR TAXPAYERS AND THE GOVERNMENT (2020), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/JRC20_Volume3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XV6-3EUE]; 1
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2016), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ARC16_Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUU2-498Q].
239. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-721R, MILITARY PERSONNEL: ACTIVE DUTY
COMPENSATION AND ITS TAX TREATMENT 2–3 (2004). The General Accounting Office’s name
was changed to the Government Accountability Office in July of 2004. See GAO Human Capital
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271.
240. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 104, 118 Stat. 1166,
1168–69. The EITC election was made permanent in 2008. See Heroes Earnings Assistance and
Relief Tax Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-245 § 102, 122 Stat. 1624, 1625 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 32(c)(2)(B)(vi)).
241. See Theodore Paul Manno, Federal Income Taxation of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines, 50 S.D. L. REV. 293, 308–09 (2005) (noting that the combat zone pay exclusion had “unintended consequences” by reducing the servicemembers’ adjusted gross income and thereby affecting their eligibility for the EITC).
242. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 721(b), 108 Stat. 4809, 5002
(1994) (codified at I.R.C. § 6051(a)(10)).
243. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 147 (1994) (“By including on a W-2 the amount of
nontaxable earned income paid during the year by the Department of Defense, the increased information reporting is intended to allow members of the Armed Forces claiming the EITC to determine
more accurately the actual amount of EITC to which they are entitled.”).
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assists the IRS in administering the benefits and allows the IRS to grant
benefits to taxpayers with less fear of fraudulent claims and thus with
fewer audits. 244 Similarly, any technical fix for the difficulty of care
situation should address inconsistent third-party reporting by requiring
reporting of nontaxable caregiver payments.245
As noted above, Congress could allow opt-in taxation for those lowincome caregivers who would benefit more from having taxable income,
similar to the option available for combat pay. 246 To the extent that
untaxed payments currently go entirely unreported, this option would also
allow family caregivers to build Social Security and Medicare credits,
and ameliorate the generational poverty that caregiving can produce.247
A purely optional exclusion, however, is problematic on
administrability and antipoverty grounds. Lower income taxpayers who
should opt to include difficulty of care income are less likely to
understand the forms and instructions and may underclaim their benefits.
Researchers Gleason and Tong at the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, found that the election for combat pay
“makes certain personnel worse off because it adds more complexity to
the EITC calculation” 248 and EITC optimization rates were lower for
servicemembers who should have opted in to taxation. The gross income
exclusion election increases compliance costs and taxpayer confusion
and will likely lead to underutilization of benefits. Rather than an option,
Gleason and Tong advocate for a mandatory inclusion of combat pay in
gross income, which would ensure that the neediest families receive the
EITC. Congress could consider this approach for difficulty of care
payments as well, assuming the EITC remains tied to income.
There are other options. First, Congress could expressly provide that
difficulty of care payments be considered earned income for EITC
purposes but not be included in gross income. Congress chose this option
for the child tax credit when fixing the problem of military combat pay.249
244. See I.R.S. Pub. 1415, at 14 (2019) (graphically showing the “Effect of Information Reporting on Individual Income Tax Reporting Compliance, Tax Years 2011–2013”).
245. In order to standardize tax reporting and reduce confusion, Congress may want to also
address worker classification in the caregiving context.
246. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B) (providing sources of funds that “shall [not] be taken into account”
for the calculation for earned income).
247. See Kaplan, Family Caregiving, supra note 16, at 631. See also supra note 116 (discussing
the extent to which payments not subject to income tax may be mistakenly excluded from employment tax).
248. Suzanne Gleason & Patricia K. Tong, Nontaxable Combat Pay Election and the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 2015 IRS-TPC RSCH. CONF. 207, 214.
249. See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 104(a), 118 Stat.
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This solution would avoid the complexity of an election, and it would
ensure that families would not accidentally lose the EITC. However, this
subsidy design would not be targeted to those most in need and could
provide substantial benefits to moderate-income taxpayers.250
Second, Congress might direct the IRS to automatically determine the
option that would maximize a taxpayer’s refund.251 This automatic
optimizing strategy could potentially be employed both for combat pay
and for difficulty of care income, as well as for any other gross income
exclusion that Congress might enact. However, the IRS could not easily
take the interplay with caregiver eligibility for health insurance into
account when making this calculation. 252 Therefore, a taxpayer would
need the option to deviate from the EITC-maximizing decision in order
to avoid collateral harm. This is an imperfect solution for the same
reasons that an election is problematic.
The solutions proposed above all require legislative action. If Congress
does not act, could the IRS take action on its own to act in better
conformity with the values supporting community care for adults with
disabilities? The disorienting whiplash between PMTA 2010-07, Notice
2014-7, and Feigh was in part caused by a process failure: the IRS did
not seek public comment prior to changing its longstanding position in
2014. It is possible that a public comment process might have alerted the
government to the conflicts and uncertainties that awaited after Notice
2014-7 and warned the Treasury of the need for legislative harmonization
of policy. 253 With input from stakeholders, Notice 2014-7 might also
have anticipated more of the administrative problems that occurred and
tried to better address inaccurate and inconsistent reporting. However,
given the clashing and outdated provisions and language of the Code,

1166, 1168–69 (codified at I.R.C. § 24(d)(1)) (stating that for the purposes of calculating a taxpayer’s earned income to determine the amount of the taxpayer’s child tax credit, “any amount
excluded from gross income by reason of section 112 shall be treated as earned income which is
taken into account in computing taxable income for the taxable year”).
250. See Petitioners’ Seriatim Answering Brief, supra note 184, at 24–25.
251. Thanks to Professor Leslie Book for this suggestion.
252. The IRS has knowledge of taxpayers’ health insurance status after the fact, based on information in returns filed under I.R.C. §§ 6055, 6056, and 36B(f)(3). See generally I.R.S. Notice 202076, § 2, 2020-47 I.R.B. 1058, 1058. However, this retroactive information is not sufficient to understand a taxpayer’s current circumstances relevant to their health insurance status and options.
253. Benefits of stakeholder participation in the development of guidance include giving the
agency better information so that it makes better rules. Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 525 (2012) (“Rulemaking that fails to benefit from the collective wisdom of those whom the agency is regulating can
have significant adverse effects.”). Also, public participation in the guidance process bolsters the
democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra
note 205, at 1805.
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even the best-informed IRS guidance could not have pulled § 131 into the
twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
While technical fixes such as those adopted for servicemembers in
combat zones would undoubtedly help family caregivers, policymakers
should take a deeper look at how the tax code can support community
integration and care. Opt-in or targeted taxation and improved third-party
reporting would not fix the problematic foster care framework or fully
incorporate the values recognized by the Supreme Court in Olmstead.
The development of our national caregiving strategy should involve a
review of federal laws to identify areas, like § 131, where the laws are
outdated and fail to reflect contemporary values.254
Siloed policymaking hurts people with disabilities and their caregivers.
The outdated paternalistic language of the tax code is inconsistent with
contemporary values of autonomy and self-direction expressed in
Medicaid and in national disability policy, particularly since the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Better coordination between tax
and health care policy can further these values and the goals of
community integration and mitigate some of the hardships facing family
caregivers by making financial supports more accessible.

254. It is notable that the Family Caregiving Advisory Council, established by the RAISE Act
to develop a “Family Caregiving Strategy,” includes individuals who are care recipients as well as
care providers. See RAISE Family Caregivers Act, Pub. L. No. 115-119, §§ 3, 4(b), 132 Stat. 23,
23–25 (2018); RAISE Family Caregiving Advisory Council, ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING,
https://acl.gov/programs/support-caregivers/raise-family-caregiving-advisory-council
[https://perma.cc/8AJD-LQNR] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020) (providing biographical information on
each of the members of the Advisory Council, including their experiences as caregivers and care
recipients). Including marginalized voices in policymaking is a significant step toward living our
professed values.

